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Dissociation is typically defined as the lack of normal integration of thoughts, feelings, and experiences
into consciousness and memory. The present article critically evaluates the research literature on
cognitive processes in dissociation. The authors’ review indicates that dissociation is characterized by
subtle deficits in neuropsychological performance (e.g., heightened distractibility). Some of the cognitive
phenomena (e.g., weakened cognitive inhibition) associated with dissociation appear to be dependent on
the emotional or attentional context. Contrary to a widespread assumption in the clinical literature,
dissociation does not appear to be related to avoidant information processing. Rather, it is associated with
an enhanced propensity toward pseudo-memories, possibly mediated by heightened levels of interrog-
ative suggestibility, fantasy proneness, and cognitive failures. Evidence for a link between dissociation
and either memory fragmentation or early trauma based on objective measures is conspicuously lacking.
The authors identify a variety of methodological issues and discrepancies that make it difficult to
articulate a comprehensive framework for cognitive mechanisms in dissociation. The authors conclude
with a discussion of research domains (e.g., sleep-related experiences, drug-related dissociation) that
promise to advance our understanding of cognition and dissociation.
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Dissociation is defined by the fourth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–IV–TR; Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 519) as “a disruption in the
usually integrated function of consciousness, memory, identity, or
perception of the environment.” Whereas many authors regard
symptoms of derealization, depersonalization, and psychogenic
amnesia as core features of dissociation, the concept of dissocia-
tion is semantically open and lacks a precise and generally ac-
cepted definition. Accordingly, workers in the field have invoked
dissociation to describe disparate phenomena, including perception
without awareness and hypnosis (Carden˜a, 1994).
More widely accepted, however, is the idea that dissociative
symptoms are manifestations of an automatic defense mechanism
that serves to mitigate the impact of highly aversive or traumatic
events (van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). Moreover, there is
little dispute that many dissociative symptoms reflect profound
cognitive aberrations. Indeed, the often quoted DSM–IV–TR defi-
nition cited above alludes to serious memory and attention prob-
lems. The current review examines the empirical basis of the claim
that marked cognitive deficits lie at the core of dissociative
phenomena.
In their mild form, dissociative experiences are common in the
general population (e.g., Ross, Joshi, & Currie, 1991), yet they are
especially frequent and severe in certain diagnostic groups, includ-
ing borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and schizophrenia (e.g., Holmes et al., 2005; Merckel-
bach, a` Campo, Hardy, & Giesbrecht, 2005), and they are hallmark
features of the dissociative disorders, including dissociative iden-
tity disorder (DID) and depersonalization disorder (DPD). The
DSM–IV–TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) definition
of dissociation (see also E. M. Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) along
with widely held clinical assumptions (van der Hart, Nijenhuis,
Steele, & Brown, 2006) imply that individuals who experience
high levels of dissociation exhibit attention and memory dysfunc-
tions, engendered by the purported defensive function of dissoci-
ation (e.g., Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; van der Hart, Nijenhuis,
Steele, & Brown, 2004).
The idea of dissociation serving a defensive function can be
traced back to Pierre Janet’s (1889/1973) pioneering investigations
of dissociative phenomena. Janet coined the term “de´saggre´ga-
tion,” which was later translated as “dissociation.” He is widely
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acknowledged to be the first scientist to link dissociation to stress
and psychological trauma (Hacking, 1995; van der Kolk & van der
Hart, 1989). Janet regarded dissociation as a coping mechanism
that individuals invoke unconsciously to blunt the impact of trau-
matic experiences, a view echoed by modern dissociation research-
ers like Gershuny and Thayer (1999, p. 647), who argued that
“when emotional pain is acute and deemed unbearable by the
sufferer, dissociation may be called upon as means of escape.”
Accordingly, dissociative symptoms are thought to manifest them-
selves in the form of “freezing, analgesia, and emotional numbing
[which] are elicited automatically” (Nijenhuis, Spinhoven,
Vanderlinden, van Dyck, & van der Hart, 1998, p. 65). Once
individuals have learned to use dissociation to cope with a highly
aversive event, dissociation can presumably become automatized
and invoked on a habitual basis in response to even minor stres-
sors. Habitual dissociation, in turn, engenders emotional constric-
tion and numerous and varied manifestations of psychopathology
(van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1989). The idea that trauma directly
causes dissociation is ubiquitous in contemporary clinical litera-
ture (see, for a critical review, Kihlstrom, 2005; Merckelbach &
Muris, 2001) and often is presented as an uncontroversial issue or
incontrovertible fact (Gast, Rodewald, Nickel, & Emrich, 2001;
Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Irwin, 1998; Reinders et al., 2006).
Dissociative symptoms range from common cognitive failures,
such as lapses in attention, to nonpathological absorption and
daydreaming, to more pathological manifestations of dissociation,
as represented by the dissociative disorders (Holmes et al., 2005).
Even within these categories, individual dissociative symptoms
differ widely in their expression. Based on the phenomenological
differences among dissociative amnesia, absorption, depersonal-
ization, and derealization, one might speculate that at least some of
these symptoms have relatively little in common etiologically and
depend on distinct biological substrates. Accordingly, a number of
authors have criticized the notion of dissociation as a unitary
conceptual domain (Hacking, 1995; Holmes et al., 2005; Jureidini,
2003).
In line with Carden˜a (1994) and J. G. Allen (2001), Holmes et
al. (2005) proposed two distinct forms of dissociation, namely
detachment and compartmentalization. Detachment consists of
depersonalization, derealization, and related phenomena, like out-
of-body experiences. Psychopathological conditions that reflect
symptoms of detachment are DPD and feelings of “nowness”
during flashbacks in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Compartmen-
talization, in contrast, encompasses dissociative amnesia and so-
matoform dissociation, such as sensory loss and “unexplained”
neurological symptoms (Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, van Dyck, van der
Hart, & Vanderlinden, 1998). The core feature of compartmental-
ization is a deficit in deliberate control of processes or actions that
would normally be amenable to control, as is evident in DID or
somatization disorder. Although clinicians may find it helpful to
subdivide dissociative symptoms into different symptom clusters
(Bernstein-Carlson & Putnam, 1993), attempts to psychometrically
differentiate separate symptom clusters have not been uniformly
successful, as we explain in the course of our discussion.
Partly on the basis of Putnam’s (1997) discrete behavioral states
model, van der Hart et al. (2004, 2006) recently argued for a quali-
tative demarcation between pathological dissociation—which they
refer to as trauma-related dissociation or structural dissociation of the
personality—and nonpathological dissociative experiences (i.e., alter-
ations in the levels and field of consciousness, such as absorption and
altered sense of time). van der Hart et al. (2004, p. 910) considered
structural dissociation to be a “dimensional construct” but described
three prototypal levels of structural dissociation for heuristic purposes.
Thus, primary structural dissociation consists of one apparently nor-
mal part of the personality and one emotional part of the personality,
with the emotional part of the personality suffering with “partial or
complete amnesia” but also experiencing “hypermnesia and re-
experiencing of the trauma” (van der Hart et al., 2004, p. 910). In
contrast, the most extreme manifestation of structural dissociation,
tertiary structural dissociation, is ostensibly limited to DID and is
characterized by several apparently normal and emotional parts of the
personality. However, as our review will demonstrate, researchers’
attempts to discriminate pathological from nonpathological dissocia-
tive experiences psychometrically have largely yielded disappointing
results.
Whatever the precise subdivision among dissociative symp-
toms, there are compelling reasons to question a number of long
and widely held assumptions concerning dissociation, many of
which have been extremely influential in the clinical literature. In
this article, we specifically address the idea that dissociation is
accompanied by serious cognitive aberrations. We begin our re-
view with an examination of crucial issues in the measurement of
dissociation. We next describe personality traits, including fantasy
proneness, interrogative suggestibility, and susceptibility to cog-
nitive failures, which map onto the construct of dissociation. Then,
we evaluate neuropsychological studies of dissociation; studies of
the relationships among dissociation, memory, and memory frag-
mentation; and the link between dissociation, on the one hand, and
information-processing capabilities and superior forgetting of neu-
tral and emotional information, on the other. We conclude with a
discussion of possible future research avenues that promise to
bridge the wide gap between dissociation theory and research.
Measurement of Dissociation
To make psychiatric diagnoses more reliable, researchers devel-
oped the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–III–R (Spitzer,
Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1990) and DSM–IV disorders (First,
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1994). However, these interviews do
not include procedures to diagnose the dissociative disorders. To
remedy this shortcoming, Steinberg (1993, 1994) developed the
Structured Clinical Interview for the Dissociative Disorders
(SCID–D), widely considered the preferred instrument for the
diagnosis of the these disorders (Draijer & Boon, 1993). Ross et al.
(1989) developed the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule
as an alternative structured diagnostic interview. However, Kihl-
strom (2005, p. 3) pointed out that “even with relatively strict
criteria in place, it can be difficult to discriminate between the
dissociative disorders and bipolar disorder, borderline personality
disorder, and even schizophrenia.”
The official inclusion of dissociative disorders in the third
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM–III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) led to the
development of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; E. M.
Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), which became the standard instrument
to quantify the frequency of dissociative symptoms (Wright &
Loftus, 1999). The DES has been used extensively in both clinical
and nonclinical samples (van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). Its
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widespread use is reflected by the fact that a computerized search
in February 2008 using PsycINFO indicated that at least 631
articles have employed this measure since it was developed in
1986. The DES quantifies the frequency with which respondents
experience 28 dissociative phenomena in daily life. These phe-
nomena include experiences of autobiographical amnesia, dereal-
ization, depersonalization, and absorption, and they are measured
on 100-mm visual analogue scales. The revised version of the
DES, the DES–II, no longer uses a visual analogue format and
instead relies on a Likert-type format (Bernstein-Carlson & Put-
nam, 1993). Respondents are asked to indicate how often (in
percent of the time) they experience specific dissociative symp-
toms. The DES total score consists of the arithmetic mean of all 28
items and can vary between 0 and 100. Higher values imply an
increased frequency of dissociative experiences. Values above 25
or 30 are thought to indicate potential dissociative psychopathol-
ogy (Putnam, Carlson, Ross, & Anderson, 1996).
In their meta-analysis, van IJzendoorn and Schuengel (1996)
evaluated the validity of the DES by investigating the correlations
between this instrument and various self-report questionnaires and
semi-structured interviews. They reported significant correlations
of the DES with measures of related phenomena (e.g., Perceptual
Aberration Scale, Questionnaire of Experiences of Dissociation,
Bliss Scale, Dissociation Questionnaire; see below), and even
higher correlations with the outcomes of semi-structured inter-
views (e.g., Structured Clinical Interview for the Dissociative
Disorders). Additionally, the researchers concluded that the DES
exhibits excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s   .93) and
good temporal reliability, with test–retest correlations ranging
from .74 to .84 (Holtgraves & Stockdale, 1997).
Although the DES was developed to measure a unidimensional
dissociative construct, other researchers were quick to point out
that the DES may be multidimensional. Carlson et al.’s (1991)
factor analysis yielded three factors: amnesia, absorption, and
depersonalization. However, even today, there is no consensus
regarding the factor structure of the DES. Whereas various studies
have replicated Carlson et al.’s three factor solution (Ross, Ellason,
& Anderson, 1995; B. Sanders & Green, 1994) or have identified
four factors (Ray & Faith, 1994), other research has suggested that
the DES is unidimensional. For example, N. G. Waller (1995)
reanalyzed Carlson et al.’s (1991) original data and concluded that
their three factor solution could reflect the skewed distribution of
the DES items and thus could be a statistical artifact reflecting the
presence of difficulty factors or “artifactors” (for a recent contri-
bution to this discussion, see Holmes et al., 2005).
One criticism of the DES is that it contains a substantial number
of items that assess absorption, which is “a characteristic of the
individual that involves an openness to experience emotional and
cognitive alterations across a variety of situations” (Roche &
McConkey, 1990, p. 92). Absorption is closely related to the
superordinate trait of openness to experience and is not inherently
psychopathological (Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995). To resolve
this issue, and to discriminate benign from pathological forms of
dissociation, N. G. Waller, Putnam, and Carlson (1996) developed
the DES—Taxon (DES–T). They extracted eight items from the
DES measuring derealization, depersonalization, psychogenic am-
nesia, and identity alteration, and they excluded items tapping
nonpathological features of dissociation, notably absorption. De-
veloped with taxometric methods (Meehl & Golden, 1982), the
DES–T calculates the probability that a respondent belongs to a
presumed pathological taxon (natural category) of dissociation.
The DES–T has been widely employed in clinical studies (Irwin,
1999; Simeon, Guralnik, Schmeidler, Sirof, & Knutelska, 2001;
Tampke & Irwin, 1999; Waldo & Merritt, 2000; G. Waller, Oha-
nian, Meyer, Everill, & Rouse, 2001). Simeon et al.’s (1998)
finding—that the DES–T total score performs better than the
standard DES total score in discriminating patients with DPD from
healthy control participants—has provided support for the validity
of the DES–T.
However, other studies have cast doubt on the DES–T’s utility.
For example, Simeon, Knutelska, Nelson, Guralnik, and Schmei-
dler (2003) found that within a sample of patients with DPD
(N  100), the DES–T classified only 64% of patients with DPD
as having a dissociative disorder. Additionally, researchers (Gies-
brecht, Merckelbach, & Geraerts, 2007; Leavitt, 1999) have ar-
gued that the DES–T may yield a high proportion of false positive
classifications (i.e., erroneously diagnosing asymptomatic individ-
uals with a dissociative disorder), especially in samples with low
rates of dissociative disorders. Moreover, Modestin and Erni
(2004, p. 81) “were unable to find a statistically significant rela-
tionship between dissociative disorder diagnosis and taxon mem-
bership.” Testing the DES–T’s construct validity, Watson (2003a)
investigated the temporal stability of dissociative taxon member-
ship probability in a sample of 465 undergraduates. His study
yielded a disappointing test–retest correlation of .34 for taxon
membership probability. Watson (2003a) noted that “reduced sta-
bilities raise very serious concerns about the ultimate existence of
a pathological dissociative taxon” (p. 303) and cautioned research-
ers about employing the taxon probability as a measure of patho-
logical dissociation in nonclinical samples. Moreover, although the
DES–T was designed to exclude experiences of absorption, it is
highly related to the absorption items of the DES (Giesbrecht,
Merckelbach, & Geraerts, 2007) and the remaining 20 nonpatho-
logical items of the DES (Davis-Merritt & You, 2008), which led
Leavitt (1999, p. 437) to conclude that “the parallels between DES,
DES–T, and absorption continua in samples of dissociative disor-
dered patients are striking.” Nevertheless, it would be informative
if future studies would systematically examine the independent
contribution of absorption and more pathological dissociation
items as predictors of research outcomes (e.g., memory perfor-
mance). That said, many studies we review documented differ-
ences between high and low scorers on the DES and the DES–T
with respect to a variety of measures of memory and cognition.
Researchers have developed a number of alternative question-
naires to quantify dissociative symptoms. They include the Per-
ceptual Alterations Scale (S. Sanders, 1986), the Questionnaire of
Experiences of Dissociation (Riley, 1988), the Dissociation Ques-
tionnaire (Vanderlinden, Van Dyck, Vandereycken, & Vertom-
men, 1991), the Dissociative Processes Scale (Watson, 2003a), and
the Mini-Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Dissociative
Disorders (Steinberg, Rounsaville, Buchanan, & Cicchetti, 1992).
Except for the Mini-Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV
Dissociative Disorders, which is modeled after the Structured
Clinical Interview for the Dissociative Disorders (Steinberg,
1993), all these questionnaires contain many items measuring
nonpathological dissociative symptoms (i.e., absorption).
Recently, researchers have developed questionnaires to measure
only part of the dissociative spectrum, such as somatoform disso-
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ciation (Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire; Nijenhuis, Spin-
hoven, Van Dyck, Van der Hart, & Vanderlinden, 1996) or deper-
sonalization/derealization (Cambridge Depersonalization Scale,
Sierra & Berrios, 2000; Depersonalization Severity Scale, Simeon,
Guralnik, & Schmeidler, 2001). However, the discriminant valid-
ity of these two scales with respect to nonpathological dissociation
(i.e., fantasy immersion) is unknown. In addition, Simeon, Smith,
Knutelska, and Smith (in press) showed that even the Cambridge
Depersonalization Scale and the Somatoform Dissociation Ques-
tionnaire, two measures designed to measure distinct manifesta-
tions of dissociation, are moderately correlated in patients with
DPD (r  .50). Thus, the discriminant correlation between these
two measures is comparable with the convergent correlations of
the DES with other measures of dissociation (van IJzendoorn &
Schuengel, 1996).
In sum, it is essential to understand the shortcomings of the
DES, as discussed above, when interpreting the findings from
studies that rely on the DES or similar instruments. Nevertheless,
the DES has proven to be valuable across a variety of studies using
different experimental paradigms and has substantially contributed
to the accumulation of our knowledge about the concomitants of
dissociative symptoms. Although the reader will note that some
disparities in findings we report may be accounted for in terms of
measurement issues, there also are notable convergences in out-
comes across studies based on the DES and other self-report
measures of dissociation. Here, we discuss research relying on
self-report measures administered to individuals with dissociative
tendencies and examine independently findings pertinent to pa-
tients with formally diagnosed dissociative disorders.
Given its centrality in any discussion of dissociation, we weave
considerations regarding the trauma–dissociation link into our
review and examine how research findings related to the cognitive
concomitants of dissociation bear on the hypothetical association
between trauma and dissociation later in our discussion. However,
our main focus throughout is on cognitive processes in dissocia-
tion.
Questionnaire Correlates of Dissociative Tendencies
Study Selection
Studies on questionnaire correlates of dissociative tendencies
were identified through searches of the Medline and PsycINFO
electronic databases by using the entry terms dissociation, multiple
personality disorder, dissociative, depersonalization, or deperson-
alisation, in combination with other terms including cognitive
failures, fantasy, and suggestibility. We limited our search to
articles written in English and published after 1980, the year in
which the dissociative disorders were introduced in the third
edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).
Our literature search yielded 357 hits. We then examined titles
and abstracts to identify studies using a standardized empirical
methodology, adult samples, and at least one other relevant self-
report measure. To be included, studies were required to (a)
include at least one (sub)sample of patients with a dissociative
disorder (n  10) or (b) rely on a standardized self-report measure
of dissociation (e.g., DES) in a clinical or nonclinical sample (N
20) and present statistics directly relevant to the relation between
dissociation and the questionnaire at hand. This procedure yielded
30 eligible studies. We then identified additional articles that might
be relevant by examining references in articles selected during the
literature search. Studies from the authors’ archives were also
included.
Fantasy Proneness
Fantasy, daydreaming, and imagination are associated with
healthy psychological functioning. Although the inability to con-
trol these processes is associated with, if not causally related to,
psychological problems (Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995), most
individuals who fantasize extensively exhibit no signs of serious
psychopathology (Merckelbach & Muris, 2001). Meanwhile, re-
searchers have established that dissociative experiences and fan-
tasy proneness are related. By using the Inventory of Childhood
Memories and Imaginings (S. C. Wilson & Barber, 1983), Rausch-
enberger and Lynn (1995) compared 26 participants who reported
extensive fantasizing with 26 participants with less extensive fan-
tasy histories. They found that fantasy-prone individuals (i.e.,
fantasizers) had higher levels of dissociative symptoms than did
nonfantasizers. Similarly, Silva and Kirsch (1992) found a corre-
lation of r  .42 between the Inventory of Childhood Memories
and Imaginings and the DES. Green, Kvaal, Lynn, Mare, and
Sandberg (1991) administered a measure of fantasy proneness
along with four widely used dissociation measures to 1,249 college
students and found that fantasy proneness and dissociation corre-
lated in the order of r  .47–.63. Segal and Lynn (1992–1993) also
found evidence for moderate correlations (r  .40–.44) between
two measures of dissociation and scales of daydreaming and poor
attentional control. Moreover, Ruiz, Pincus, and Ray (1999) found
that dissociation overlaps with openness to experience (but see
Kwapil, Wrobel, & Pope, 2002). Finally, in a sample of children,
Rhue, Lynn, and Sandberg (1995) determined that a measure of
childhood dissociation correlated at r  .54 with a measure of
childhood fantasy. Other studies obtained similar results, with
correlations between dissociation and fantasy proneness ranging
from r  .43 to r  .58 (Geraerts, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Smeets, &
van Heerden, 2006; Gow, Lang, & Chant, 2004; Maltby, Day,
McCutcheon, Houran, & Ashe, 2006; Merckelbach, Horselenberg,
& Schmidt, 2002; Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999; Merck-
elbach, Muris, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2000).
Researchers have found that dissociative experiences and fan-
tasy proneness are associated with each other not only in healthy
samples but also in clinical populations (Merckelbach et al., 2005;
Pekala et al.,, 1999–2000). Pekala et al. (1999–2000) reported a
correlation of r  .41 between measures of the two constructs in a
sample of 1,229 drug addicts (see also Pekala, Angelini, & Kumar,
2001), and Merckelbach et al. (2005) reported an overall correla-
tion of r  .55 in a mixed sample of psychiatric patients (e.g.,
patients with schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and
major depressive disorder). Importantly, the dissociation–fantasy
proneness link cannot be explained by the fact that the DES
includes absorption items, which are closely related to fantasy
proneness: Correlations between fantasy proneness and the DES
Amnesia and Depersonalization subscales (Giesbrecht, Merckel-
bach, Kater, & Sluis, 2007) and the DES–T (Giesbrecht, Merck-
elbach, & Geraerts, 2007) remain in the r  .40–.48 range. Fur-
thermore, Levin, Sirof, Simeon, and Guralnick (2004) and
Huntjens et al. (2006) reported elevated levels of fantasy proneness
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in patients with DPD and DID as compared with those of non-
symptomatic participants.
The fact that individuals who dissociate frequently engage in
fantasizing may have profound consequences for understanding
the origins of dissociative experiences. Notably, imaginative ten-
dencies may compromise the validity of self-report questionnaires
that measure trauma on a retrospective basis. Fantasy proneness
could affect responses to such questionnaires in two ways. First,
fantasizers may confuse imagined events with factual autobio-
graphical memories. The failure to differentiate imagined from real
memories is termed a reality monitoring error (M. K. Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Second, fantasy-prone individuals
may adopt a more liberal response criterion for reporting an
experience as genuine (i.e., a “real” memory), thus exhibiting a
positive response bias, or in more extreme cases, a tendency to
confabulate, as we discuss in more depth later.
Suggestibility
Several investigators have speculated that high levels of disso-
ciation would predict the tendency to incorporate misleading in-
formation into memory. Using a staged event paradigm, Eisen and
Carlson (1998) noted that undergraduate students’ DES scores
were related to their errors on misleading questions about the
event. However, Eisen, Qin, Goodman, and Davis (2002) found no
evidence for such a link in their sample of children. The authors
attributed their failure to replicate their earlier research to the age
of their participants, as dissociation, and especially imaginative
involvement, is much more prevalent in younger individuals.
Interrogative suggestibility involves “the tendency of an indi-
vidual’s account of events to be altered by misleading information
and inter-personal pressure within an interview” (Singh & Gud-
jonsson, 1992, p. 155). Gudjonsson and his colleagues developed
the Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility (GSS; Gud-
jonsson, 1984) to predict susceptibility to highly suggestive ques-
tioning during a police interrogation (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1984;
Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986).
The GSS involves three phases. First, the experimenter reads a
story to participants. Next, participants respond to 20 questions
about the story: 5 are nonleading and concern information pre-
sented in the story (e.g., “Did the woman have a husband called
Simon?”—correct answer: yes), and 15 are highly suggestive and
concern information not present in the story (e.g., “Were the
assailants convicted six weeks after their arrest?”—correct an-
swer: do not know). Wrong answers to these latter questions make
up the Yield scale of the GSS. Finally, participants receive nega-
tive feedback about their performance and are asked to answer all
questions once more. Changes in responses following negative
feedback compose the Shift scale of the GSS. The sum of both
scales represents the total GSS score. Wolfradt and Meyer (1998)
found correlations of r  .53 between the DES and the Yield scale
and r  .44 between the DES and the Shift scale in a mixed sample
of 37 anxious patients and 44 nonsymptomatic participants. More-
over, the DES and the total GSS score were correlated at r  .54.
Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, and Horselenberg (2000) reported a
smaller, albeit significant, correlation (r  .37) between the DES
and the GSS total score in an undergraduate sample (N  56) and
a correlation of r  .29 between the DES and the Yield score. In
contrast, the correlation between the DES and the Shift scale failed
to attain significance (r  .22; see also Polczyk, 2005). Addition-
ally, when the researchers controlled statistically for the influence
of cognitive failures, as measured by the Cognitive Failures Ques-
tionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982), the
significant correlations between DES and suggestibility indices
disappeared.
Cognitive Failures
The latter finding is not surprising inasmuch as individuals who
are prone to dissociation also report more cognitive failures, as
measured by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. This question-
naire asks respondents to indicate on a 5-point scale how fre-
quently they experience everyday cognitive failures, including
forgetting names, missing signs on the road, or being distracted.
The correlation between the DES and the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire ranges from r  .43 to .61 (Merckelbach, Horselen-
berg, & Schmidt, 2002; Merckelbach et al., 1999; Wright &
Osborne, 2005). Moreover, the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
correlates with all DES subscales, with correlations ranging from
r  .34 to .46 (Bruce, Ray, & Carlson, 2007), and so these corre-
lations are not solely due to an overlap between nonpathological
manifestations of dissociation and cognitive failures. Studies have
shown that dissociative symptoms change with age. In fact, there
is a well-documented age-related reduction in dissociative tenden-
cies after the 4th decade (Walker, Gregory, Oakley, Bloch, &
Gardener, 1996). Scores on instruments like the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire also tend to decline with age. One reason for this
could be the less taxing lifestyles that often accompany old age
(Reason, 1993).
Merckelbach, Horselenberg, et al. (2002) investigated the hy-
pothesis that the relation between self-reported trauma and disso-
ciation is due to individual differences in cognitive failures and
fantasy proneness. They used structural equation modeling in a
nonclinical sample of 109 undergraduates and tested two contrast-
ing models. Model 1 was the classical trauma-dissociation model,
which assumes that trauma precedes dissociation, which in turn
potentiates fantasy proneness and cognitive failures. In contrast,
Model 2 presumes that dissociation is the starting point, leading to
fantasy proneness and cognitive failures. In this model, fantasy
proneness and cognitive failures would be expected to contribute
to retrospective reports of traumatic experiences. The authors
found support for both models, which means that their data do not
contradict the possibility that fantasy proneness and cognitive
failures fuel overreporting of trauma.
Model 2 begs the question of the origins of dissociative expe-
riences. Research investigating the heritability of cognitive failures
and fantasy proneness may shed light on this question. Relying on
a sample of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, Boomsma (1998, p.
321) noted that “a substantial part of the inter-individual variation
in everyday cognitive failures in memory, perception and motor
control can be attributed to genetic factors.” Likewise, fantasy
proneness can be regarded as a lower-order facet of the superor-
dinate personality trait of “openness to experience,” which itself
has substantial heritability (Bergeman et al., 1993). By using twin
registry data, Lang, Paris, Zweig-Frank, and Livesley (1998) in-
vestigated the heritability of dissociative experiences and reported
that about half of the variability in dissociative experiences can be
attributed to genetic factors. However, the evidence from twin
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studies for the heritability of dissociative experiences is mixed:
N. G. Waller and Ross (1997) found no indications for a genetic
basis, whereas a recent study of children and adolescents found “a
substantial genetic contribution to dissociation scores” (Becker-
Blease et al., 2004, p. 530).
To summarize, dissociation shares a moderate-to-large propor-
tion of variance with fantasy proneness, (interrogative) suggest-
ibility, and susceptibility to cognitive failures. The overlap be-
tween fantasy involvement and dissociation raises the possibility
that dissociation is associated with a heightened risk of confabu-
lation and pseudo-memories (Merckelbach, Muris, Horselenberg,
& Stougie, 2000). Furthermore, cognitive failures in the context of
dissociation may serve as a confound in studies that solicit retro-
spective reports about exposure to traumatic experiences, such as
a history of early abuse. More specifically, individuals who report
many cognitive failures are probably more prone to mistrust their
memories, which might increase their susceptibility to misleading
post hoc information (Loftus, 1993). Accordingly, a combination
of fantasy proneness, interrogative suggestibility, and the suscep-
tibility to cognitive failures may undermine the accuracy of retro-
spective reports of traumatic experiences, resulting in overesti-
mates of childhood trauma rates (i.e., false positives).
Although we have assumed that susceptibility to cognitive fail-
ures and a tendency to fantasize should engender overreporting of
traumatic experiences, one could also argue that the opposite is
true. Hypothetically, individuals high on dissociation could also
report a relatively smaller number of traumatic experiences, as
compared with actual trauma rates, due to higher rates of forget-
fulness (i.e., cognitive failures). Alternatively, high dissociators
with profound imaginative abilities may develop pseudo-memories
of a trauma-free childhood, which could lead to systematic under-
estimates of traumatic experiences and their relation to dissocia-
tion (i.e., false negatives).
Meanwhile, there are good empirical reasons to suspect that in
this context, false positives are more likely to occur than false
negatives. Gilbert (1991) reviewed a large body of experimental
evidence concerning people’s tendencies to believe and disbelieve
and concluded that “people are credulous creatures who find it
very easy to believe and very difficult to doubt” (p. 177). Accord-
ing to Gilbert (1991), disbelief tends to occur after initial accep-
tance of an idea or belief, even when the content is of unknown
truth value or known to be false. Evidence for this contention
comes from a broad range of studies, many published after Gil-
bert’s (1991) review. For example, Hasson and Glucksberg (2006)
used a lexical decision task and found that both affirmative and
negated assertions facilitate access to affirmative-related terms in
early stages of comprehension. Relatedly, Pandelaere and Dewitte
(2006) found that when readers process questions, they initially
represent the questions as true statements. Moreover, Gilbert,
Tafarodi, and Malone (1993) determined that cognitive load and
time pressure increased individuals’ tendencies to believe false
information.
Brewer, Lillie, and Hallman’s (2006) research illustrated that
the difficulties that people experience to disbelieve are not limited
to laboratory settings. The investigators determined that 65% of
Gulf War veterans believed they had been exposed to biological or
chemical warfare agents. This claim stands in sharp contrast to the
U.S. military’s statement denying any exposure. Interestingly, the
authors found that many of these soldiers failed to disbelieve prior
exposure alerts from the military. Although it seems that believing
is cognitively easier than disbelieving, Merckelbach, van Roer-
mund, and Candel (2007) and Wright, Loftus, and Hall (2001)
used naturalistic paradigms and determined that with the use of
appropriate manipulations, people’s reports of actual memories
can be inhibited (but see Pezdek & Roe, 1997).
With respect to the relation between self-reported traumatic
experiences and dissociation, it is noteworthy that widely used
self-report instruments such as the Childhood Trauma Question-
naire (D. P. Bernstein et al., 1994; D. P. Bernstein et al., 2003)
contain broadly formulated trauma items that inquire about beliefs
or opinions. These items may encourage overreporting of trauma,
especially among individuals high on fantasy proneness (Merck-
elbach & Jelicic, 2004). Moreover, self-report measures of trauma
obviously are not designed to create a context that discourages
reporting of traumatic experiences. Yet such a context would be
necessary to suppress self-reports of traumatic experiences in
highly suggestive individuals, so as to produce false negatives.
Interestingly, data also refute the contention that cognitive failures
and fantasy proneness lead to underreporting on self-report trauma
questionnaires insofar as measures of both constructs are posi-
tively rather than negatively related to self-reported traumatic
experiences on the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (Merckel-
bach, Horselenberg, & Schmidt, 2002).
Dissociation, Information Processing, and Memory
We have presented two contrasting views concerning the link
between dissociation and trauma. The first, the trauma-dissociation
view, is most prominently presented in the clinical literature and
holds that traumatic experiences, particularly severe childhood
abuse, constitute an important and direct developmental antecedent
of dissociative tendencies (e.g., Classen, Koopman, & Spiegel,
1993; Holmes et al., 2005; Kersting et al., 2003; Reinders et al.,
2003). Some authors have argued that dissociation can also arise in
response to other stressful, but not strictly traumatic, life events,
including emotional abuse or neglect (Simeon, Guralnik, Schmei-
dler, et al., 2001).
The second view suggests that dissociation overlaps with fan-
tasy proneness, suggestibility, and cognitive failures, all of which
may artificially inflate the relationship between dissociation and
self-reported trauma (e.g., Merckelbach, Horselenberg, &
Schmidt, 2002; Merckelbach & Muris, 2001). According to this
view, trauma and/or stressful life events are not prerequisites for
dissociation. Importantly, these two views on the relationship
between trauma and dissociation are not mutually exclusive. For
example, one could argue that trauma does not play a critical role
across the entire dissociative continuum but is restricted to cases of
profound dissociative psychopathology (e.g., van der Hart et al.,
2004). Another possibility is that fantasy proneness, suggestibility,
and cognitive failures contribute to an overestimation of an other-
wise genuine, albeit often weak, link between dissociation and
trauma. Thus, although trauma may not be the dominant etiolog-
ical factor, as some authors have proposed (Classen et al., 1993),
it may still exert some influence on dissociative psychopathology.
One core assumption of the trauma-dissociation view can be
traced to Pierre Janet (1889/1973), who argued that dissociation is
accompanied by disturbances in memory for emotional events (van
der Kolk & van der Hart, 1989). Indeed, E. M. Bernstein and
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Putnam (1986) highlighted the importance of disruptions of mem-
ory and attention in their definition of dissociation. There is a
broad consensus in the clinical literature that deficits in memory
function (e.g., compartmentalization, psychogenic amnesia) are
core features of dissociation and that these deficits serve a defen-
sive function that enables trauma victims to detach psychologically
from painful experiences (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Holmes et al.,
2005; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).
According to Ladwig et al. (2002, p. 242), “victims of a psy-
chotraumatic event may protect themselves against the over-
whelming exposure of threatening stimuli by inhibiting informa-
tion processing.” The detrimental effects of dissociation on
attention and memory are thought to stem from information-
processing disturbances that, in turn, are believed to be the by-
product of the alleged defensive function of dissociation (Spiegel
& Cardena, 1991; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Given the broad
consensus about the profound influence of dissociation on atten-
tion and memory, it is not surprising that many authors have
emphasized the importance of exploring information-processing
characteristics that accompany heightened levels of dissociation
(Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Carden˜a, 1994; Classen et al., 1993;
Dorahy, 2001; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Spiegel &
Cardena, 1991). For example, if dissociative symptoms (e.g., psy-
chogenic amnesia and derealization) do, indeed, attenuate the
impact of traumatic events, then individuals with heightened levels
of dissociation should exhibit slower or impaired processing of
threat-related information.
In sum, we have presented two views on possible cognitive
concomitants of dissociation. However, we have based our de-
scription of these two views on studies that predominantly em-
ployed self-report measures. For example, cognitive failures were
measured by means of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
(Broadbent et al., 1982), and fantasy proneness is typically mea-
sured by the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (Merckelbach,
Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001). However, self-report measures
assess beliefs pertaining to our perception of cognitive phenomena,
which may or may not be accurate, and do not assess actual
performance. For example, there is only moderate agreement be-
tween self-rated and actual neuropsychological performance in
patients with traumatic brain injury (C. C. Allen & Ruff, 1990;
Bogod, Mateer, & Macdonald, 2003). Therefore, in the sections
that follow, we critically evaluate performance studies relevant to
the issue of cognitive concomitants of dissociation.
Study Selection
We identified studies on cognitive correlates of dissociative
tendencies through searches of the Medline and PsycINFO elec-
tronic databases. We used the entry terms dissociation, multiple
personality disorder, dissociative, depersonalization, or deperson-
alisation, in combination with other terms including executive
functioning, digit span, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Stroop,
directed forgetting, amnesia, false memory, working memory,
memory fragmentation, commission error, and autobiographical
memory. We limited our search to articles written in English and
published after 1980, the year in which the dissociative disorders
were first introduced in the DSM–III (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 1980).
Our literature search yielded 1,381 hits. We then examined titles
and abstracts to identify studies using a standardized empirical
methodology, adult samples, and cognitive laboratory tasks. With
regard to dissociation, studies were required to (a) include at least
one (sub)sample of patients with a dissociative disorder (n  10)
or (b) rely on a standardized self-report measure of dissociation
(e.g., DES) in a clinical or nonclinical sample (N  20). Another
requirement was that the research presented statistics directly
relevant to the relation between dissociation and cognitive func-
tioning. This procedure yielded 60 eligible studies. We then iden-
tified additional articles that might have been relevant by exam-
ining references in articles selected during the literature search.
Studies from the authors’ archives were also included.
We present the basic findings of the selected studies separately
for those that rely on participants with a diagnosis of a dissociative
disorder and those that rely on self-report measures of dissociative
symptoms in nonclinical and clinical samples. We make this
distinction because some authors argued that there are qualitative
differences between individuals with a diagnosed dissociative dis-
order and those who merely self-report dissociative symptoms
(e.g., van der Hart et al., 2004).
Even though we agree with Holmes et al. (2005) that a more
precise analysis of how different dissociative symptom constella-
tions affect cognition may yield worthwhile findings, the current
empirical literature has not lent itself to this endeavor due to its
reliance on the DES, the lack of consensus about its factor struc-
ture, and the limited number of studies that actually examine
individuals with different dissociative disorders. The selected stud-
ies and their main findings are summarized in the Appendix.
The present review is limited to chronic dissociative symptoms
and excludes acute dissociative symptoms during traumatic expe-
riences (i.e., peri-traumatic dissociation). There are three reasons
for this restriction. First, although peri-traumatic and chronic dis-
sociation are related, the precise nature of this relationship is far
from clear (Sterlini & Bryant, 2002). Second, the number of
articles on peri-traumatic dissociation and its relation to PTSD is
substantial and constitutes a large research domain of its own. We
refer readers primarily interested in peri-traumatic dissociation to
Candel and Merckelbach’s (2004) review and Brewin, Andrews,
and Valentine’s (2000) and Ozer, Best, Lipsey, and Weiss’s (2003)
meta-analyses. Third, the focus of the present review is on cogni-
tive dysfunctions implicated in dissociation. However, cognitive
performance during peri-traumatic dissociation is difficult to in-
vestigate, insofar as high levels of peri-traumatic dissociation
almost by definition occur during extremely stressful events, like
motor vehicle accidents, and are consequently almost always as-
sessed retrospectively. Thus, participants’ acute dissociation levels
may be expected to be lower when they eventually arrive in the
laboratory. This makes it problematic to relate peri-traumatic dis-
sociation to performance on cognitive tasks (but see Giesbrecht,
Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2008; Morgan et al., 2001; Sterlini &
Bryant, 2002).
Neuropsychological Functioning
Researchers have reported deficits in neuropsychological func-
tioning in psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia (Heinrichs &
Zakzanis, 1998), borderline personality disorder (Fertuck, Lenzen-
weger, Clarkin, Hoermann, & Stanley, 2006), and depression
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(Rogers et al., 2004), conditions that often go along with height-
ened levels of dissociative symptoms (E. M. Bernstein & Putnam,
1986). Additionally, because the symptoms of neurological con-
ditions like temporal lobe epilepsy and transient global amnesia
resemble dissociative symptoms (Sivec & Lynn, 1995), it is tempt-
ing to speculate about whether a chronic state of dissociation
hampers stimulus processing and consequently neuropsychologi-
cal functioning.
Dissociative disorders. Several studies have examined the link
between dissociation and general cognitive functioning in DID
patients. Roca, Hart, Kimbrell, and Freeman (2006) found that
veterans with PTSD and a diagnosis of a dissociative disorder
(n  10) did not differ significantly from veterans with PTSD but
no dissociative disorder diagnosis (n  17) on the Wechsler Ab-
breviated Scale of Intelligence (Hays, Reas, & Shaw, 2002). Low
statistical power renders these findings difficult to interpret. Yet,
Rossini, Schwartz, and Braun (1996) administered the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1981) to a larger
sample of 105 patients with DID (n  50) or dissociative disorder
not otherwise specified (DDNOS; n  55) and reached a similar
conclusion: Patients do not show deleterious intellectual function-
ing attributable to fluctuating manifestations of their disorder.
However, patients’ test results showed abnormal (inter-test) scatter
due to subtle deficits on the WAIS’s Memory/Distractibility factor.
Germane to this issue, Kirino (2006) conducted an event-related
potential (ERP) study of 12 patients with DID and 12 matched
non-DID control participants. This author measured the P300
component during an auditory oddball task. The P300 is thought to
reflect updating of working memory (Donchin, 1981) and has been
described as reflecting tonic arousal and arousal alteration to
specific stimulus events (Polich & Kok, 1995). Reduced P300
amplitudes are associated with information-processing deficits, as
seen, for example, in schizophrenia (e.g., Friedman, Cornblatt,
Vaughan, & Erlenmeyer Kimling, 1986), whereas larger ampli-
tudes are related to superior memory performance (Fabiani, Karis,
& Donchin, 1990). DID patients exhibit reduced P300 amplitudes
as compared with control participants only during acute dissocia-
tive episodes, but not during remission (see also Fukuzako et al.,
1999).
In the first extensive study of cognitive processes in DPD,
Guralnik, Schmeidler, and Simeon (2000) found that DPD partic-
ipants differed from normal control participants on specific cog-
nitive dimensions within the general context of comparable intel-
lectual ability. Specifically, DPD participants exhibited deficits in
visual perception and visual–spatial reasoning for both two- and
three-dimensional stimuli. Their visual and verbal short-term
memories were also compromised, for both abstract and meaning-
ful information, especially under information overload conditions.
DPD participants experienced difficulty with early stimulus en-
coding tasks under conditions of heightened distraction to which
they responded with more omission errors (lowered perceptual
sensitivity). Thus, DPD appears to be characterized by a particular
vulnerability in early information processing at the level of per-
ception and attention (for a replication, see Guralnik, Giesbrecht,
Knutelska, Sirroff, & Simeon, 2007).
Elzinga et al. (2007) looked at working memory performance
and brain activation by means of functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), employing the n-back task in a mixed sample of
patients with DDNOS and DID (n  16) as compared with normal
control participants (n  16). Behaviorally, patients outperformed
control participants when task demands increased, with their per-
formance advantage being accompanied by greater anterior, dor-
solateral, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex as well as parietal
cortex activation. In contrast to Elzinga et al. (2007), Rossini et al.
(1996) and Guralnik et al. (2000, 2007) found no evidence for
either superior working memory capacity or working memory
deficits in DID, DDNOS, and DPD by using the Digit Span
subtest.
Other samples. Several other studies investigated how intel-
lectual functioning relates to dissociation in nondissociative dis-
order samples. Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Geraerts, and Smeets
(2004) investigated the link between dissociation and executive
functioning in an undergraduate sample (N  185) by using the
random number generation task (Horne, Evans, & Orne, 1982). In
this task, participants are required to generate random patterns of
numbers between 1 and 10, which requires efficient monitoring
and inhibitory (i.e., executive or frontal) functions. The researchers
found that minor disruptions in executive functioning were related
to a subclass of dissociative experiences, particularly dissociative
amnesia and elevated DES–T scores. Similarly, Cima, Merckel-
bach, Klein, Schellbach-Matties, and Kremer (2001) found a sig-
nificant association between the DES and performance on the
Behavioral Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (B. Wilson,
Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) in inmates of a
psychiatric correctional institute (N  30), with poorer perfor-
mance on frontal tasks associated with higher DES scores (r 
.39). Bruce, Ray, Bruce, Arnett, and Carlson (2007) failed to
find executive impairments in a study comparing undergraduate
students scoring high (n  33) and low (n  33) on the DES.
Mirroring research on dissociative disorders, findings concern-
ing the association between memory capacity and dissociation
have been mixed. Although most researchers have reported no
evidence for a link between dissociation and working memory
capacity (i.e., digit span, Giesbrecht, Geraerts, & Merckelbach,
2007; Papageorgiou, Ventouras, Uzunoglu, Rabavilas, & Stefanis,
2002; Stevens, Burkhardt, Hautzinger, Schwarz, & Unckel, 2004;
Wright & Osborne, 2005), some have reported that dissociative
individuals display superior verbal working memory capacity (De
Ruiter, Phaf, Elzinga, & Van Dyck, 2004; Veltman et al., 2005).
Moreover, in a sample of adolescent psychiatric patients (N  41;
Prohl, Resch, Parzer, & Brunner, 2001), dissociative symptom-
atology was related to deficits in declarative and procedural mem-
ory performance, as indexed by the California Verbal Learning
Test and the Tower of Toronto puzzle (but see Stein, Hanna,
Vaerum, & Koverola, 1999). In line with the assumption that
dissociation accompanies working memory deficits, Papageorgiou
et al. (2002) found that individuals with transient depersonaliza-
tion/realization symptoms (n  15) displayed reduced P300 am-
plitudes during the digit span task compared with nonsymptomatic
participants (n  15; see also Kirino, 2006).
De Ruiter et al. (2004) investigated verbal working memory by
using the Verbal Working Memory Span Test in a sample of 119
undergraduates. They found that individuals with dissociation lev-
els approaching the pathological range outperformed other partic-
ipants—their verbal memory span was about half a word more
than that of low or moderately dissociative individuals. Veltman et
al. (2005) investigated neurophysiological correlates of the n-back
task and the Sternberg Letter Task in 21 nonclinical participants
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who scored high and low on dissociation, respectively. High
dissociators exhibited superior performance on both verbal work-
ing memory tasks compared with that of low dissociators. fMRI
data showed that similar neural networks are activated in both
groups during these tasks, notably the dorsolateral and ventrolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and supplementary motor
area, but that high dissociative participants activate these networks
to a larger extent.
In sum, dissociation is associated with subtle and specific cog-
nitive deficits within the context of otherwise normal intellectual
ability on standard neuropsychological tests. This cognitive profile
is striking given the phenomenology of the dissociative disorders,
which are characterized by subjective reports of profound cogni-
tive disturbances like amnesia, feelings of unreality, and identity
alterations. Nevertheless, the relative absence of a robust general
neuropsychological deficit in the dissociative disorders is interest-
ing, as it seems to differentiate them from most other severe
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia. These other conditions
overlap with the dissociative disorders but, unlike dissociative
disorders, are marked by a wide and consistent range of neuropsy-
chological deficits (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998). In contrast,
different dissociative disorders appear to be related to different
cognitive deficiencies. DID is mainly characterized by perfor-
mance fluctuations, whereas DPD is associated with disruptions in
early stages of information processing. Interestingly, there are
indications that under certain circumstances, dissociative individ-
uals may exhibit a performance advantage relative to individuals
who report low levels of dissociation. However, few investigations
have controlled for general distress and psychopathology, or for
scores on the personality dimension of openness to experience,
which is moderately associated with both dissociative tendencies
(Kihlstrom, Glisky, & Angiulo, 1994) and with crystallized intel-
ligence (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005).
Emotional Information Processing
Although Janet’s (1889/1973) concept of dissociation was
grounded in the hypothesis that dissociative individuals exhibit
deviant information processing of emotional material, few studies
have followed Janet’s lead. Dorahy and his coworkers (e.g., Do-
rahy, McCusker, Loewenstein, Colbert, & Mulholland, 2006; Do-
rahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2005) and Freyd and her colleagues
(DePrince & Freyd, 1999; Freyd, Martorello, Alvardo, Hayes, &
Christman, 1998) conducted two series of studies that are notable
exceptions.
Dissociative disorders. One line of research has investigated
cognitive inhibitory functioning in DID (Dorahy, Irwin, & Middle-
ton, 2002, 2004; Dorahy et al., 2006; Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin,
2004; Dorahy et al., 2005). These studies suggest that individuals
with DID possess intact cognitive inhibitory capabilities under
neutral conditions (Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2004) but that
these capabilities become strained or degraded in an anxiety-
provoking context (Dorahy et al., 2006, 2005). To investigate
cognitive inhibition, Dorahy and colleagues (e.g., Dorahy, Middle-
ton, & Irwin, 2004) measured negative priming during a flanker
task. Dorahy, Irwin, and Middleton (2004) compared negative
priming in a sample of DID patients with that in independent
samples of depressed, PTSD, psychotic, and control participants
(each group: n  10). Interestingly, in a neutral context, the DID
sample “showed no evidence of reduced negative priming” (Do-
rahy, Irwin, & Middleton, 2004, p. 52; but see Dorahy et al., 2002).
In another study, in which the researchers compared samples of
DID patients, generalized anxiety disorder patients, and nonsymp-
tomatic control participants (each group: n  12) across neutral
and emotional contexts, a different pattern emerged (Dorahy et al.,
2006). In line with their previous findings, the DID group exhib-
ited intact cognitive inhibition in the neutral condition but poor
cognitive inhibition in an emotional context, whereas the general-
ized anxiety disorder group displayed the opposite pattern (for a
similar finding, see Dorahy et al., 2005).
Other samples. Employing a nonclinical sample, Giesbrecht,
Merckelbach, and Smeets (2006) provided further evidence for a
link between dissociation and poor cognitive inhibition during
emotional states (Dorahy et al., 2006). The researchers used an
undergraduate sample (N  40) to investigate thought suppression
in response to an emotional video fragment. They found that
students with high DES–T scores experienced difficulties in sup-
pressing emotional thoughts. However, due to the lack of a neutral
control condition, this study could not rule out the presence of a
general inhibitory control deficit in high dissociators. Much the
same is true for G. Waller, Quinton, and Watson’s (1995) study of
undergraduates (N  105), which showed that higher levels of
dissociation are related to slower responding to threatening infor-
mation.
Yet when neutral stimulus material is used, dissociation does not
appear to be associated with superior memory suppression (Wes-
sel, Wetzels, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2005). Specifically, Wessel
et al. (2005) employed Anderson and Green’s (2001) think–no
think task, which consists of three phases. In the study phase,
participants are required to memorize cue–target pairs. In the
think–no think (i.e., experimental) phase, participants are shown
only the cues. However, for some cues, participants are asked to
avoid thinking about the associated target (i.e., no-think items),
whereas for other cues they are required to think of the associated
target (i.e., think items). At the end of the task, memory for all
target items is assessed. If high dissociation levels were associated
with superior suppression capabilities, even for neutral material,
one would expect high dissociators to show less recall of no-think
items. However, Wessel et al. (2005) found no performance dif-
ferences on the think–no think task between undergraduates who
scored high (n  35) and low (n  33) on the DES, with the
Critical Group  Instruction  Trial interaction failing to reach
statistical significance.
DePrince and Freyd (1999) and Freyd et al. (1998) used the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) to investigate attentional processes
involved in dissociation. Freyd et al. (1998) administered a stan-
dard Stroop task consisting of color words, xxxs as baseline, and
words from four neutral categories (i.e., kinship, animals, house-
hold, and space) to undergraduates scoring high (n  40) or low
(n  40) on the DES. Words were presented in colored ink on
stimulus cards. The researchers determined that dissociation was
associated with delayed color-naming latencies for incongruent
color words (i.e., the standard Stroop effect) but not for other
stimulus categories. Thus, high DES students displayed more
Stroop interference than did low DES students. Freyd et al. (1998)
concluded that heightened dissociation levels are accompanied by
disruptions in attentional control, a conclusion that dovetails with
the dissociation–cognitive failures link discussed earlier.
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In a follow-up study, DePrince and Freyd (1999) extended the
standard Stroop task with emotional and neutral words. The task
was combined with a surprise free-recall test that was administered
after the Stroop procedure. On a second block of trials, a dual task
version of the Stroop was employed such that participants had to
respond as quickly as possible while they simultaneously encoded
all stimuli. This condition was included to mimic the habitual
divided attention that, according to Freyd (1996), high dissociators
employ to protect themselves when exposed to the aversive stim-
uli. Again, encoding was followed by a free-recall task. Replicat-
ing previous work (Freyd et al., 1998), high DES students (n  54)
exhibited more interference during the traditional (i.e., selective
attention) Stroop task than did low DES students (n  54). How-
ever, during the dual task version (i.e., divided attention) of the
Stroop task, this effect disappeared, with high DES individuals
now performing better than low DES participants. Furthermore,
high dissociators consistently reproduced fewer aversive words
during free recall than did low dissociators.
On the basis of this pattern of findings, DePrince and Freyd
(1999) concluded that dissociative individuals perform better in
contexts that involve multiple tasks. However, the superior per-
formance of high dissociators reached statistical significance only
when a one-tailed test was conducted. More important, Giesbrecht
(2006) failed to replicate this finding in a sample of high (n  22)
and low (n  24) dissociators. Specifically, high dissociators re-
sponded slower to all Stroop stimuli, irrespective of attention
condition or emotional valence of stimuli, whereas no group dif-
ferences in recall performance were apparent.
The studies reviewed so far suggest that only emotionally
negative material undermines the performance of high disso-
ciators. However, this conclusion was refuted by de Ruiter,
Phaf, Veltman, Kok, and van Dyck (2003), who compared
reaction times and ERPs during letter detection (i.e., detecting
the letter A in neutral and negative stimulus words) and affec-
tive evaluation (i.e., classifying a word as neutral or negative).
Interestingly, in the high dissociator group, letter detection
performance and affective evaluation were facilitated, rather
than disturbed, by negative valence. This effect was apparent in
terms of both reaction times and ERP amplitudes. The authors
concluded that “dissociative style does not correspond to a
damaged or disturbed function but to an enhanced ability to
direct and divide attention” (p. 376).
To summarize, studies have suggested that both poor and supe-
rior information-processing performance of high dissociative indi-
viduals are content (negative stimulus material) and context (dual
task condition) dependent. However, the nature of these effects is
far from clear. On the whole, evidence for a breakdown of cogni-
tive inhibition in emotionally negative contexts seems more robust
than that for superior performance of high dissociators under
divided-attention conditions. Conceptually, the well-replicated
breakdown of cognitive inhibition during emotional stress in DID
stands in stark contrast to the widespread idea that psychogenic
amnesia is a core symptom of dissociation. The point here is that
extreme inhibition, rather than lack of inhibition, is one of the few
plausible scenarios accounting for psychogenic amnesia (Ander-
son et al., 2004), if it exists at all (McNally, 2003; H. G. Pope,
Barry, Bodkin, & Hudson, 2006).
Superior Forgetting or Superior Memory?
Proponents of the trauma-dissociation view posit that the ability
to forget or compartmentalize information linked to negative emo-
tions is a core characteristic of highly dissociative individuals (van
der Hart et al., 2004). Anecdotal evidence for this hypothesis is
abundant (Terr, 1994), but controlled studies are scarce.
Nevertheless, a number of investigators have employed versions
of the directed forgetting (DF) task to investigate memory in
participants with dissociative disorders and other samples with
dissociative symptoms (Cloitre, Cancienne, Brodsky, Dulit, &
Perry, 1996; DePrince & Freyd, 2001, 2004; Devilly et al., 2007;
Elzinga, de Beurs, Sergeant, Van Dyck, & Phaf, 2000; Elzinga,
Phaf, Ardon, & van Dyck, 2003; McNally, Ristuccia, & Perlman,
2005). There are two basic versions of this paradigm (Kihlstrom,
1983): item-wise and list-wise DF. During item-wise DF, partici-
pants are exposed to a series of words that are directly followed by
a cue to either remember or forget. During list-wise DF, partici-
pants are exposed to a list of words. Typically, after the presen-
tation of the first half of the stimulus words, participants are asked
to forget all stimuli that they have seen so far while remembering
all subsequent stimuli. At the end of both versions of the DF task,
participants are asked to remember all stimulus words irrespective
of remember or forget instructions.
In general, participants tend to recall fewer stimulus words that
were coupled with a forget instruction in both variants of the DF
task. However, different mechanisms are thought to underlie the
respective effects. Briefly, the DF effect of the item-wise version
is usually attributed to attentional disengagement (i.e., failure to
encode) during presentation of stimuli coupled with a forget in-
struction. In contrast, DF effects during list-wise DF are thought to
represent retrieval inhibition of words that were encoded initially
but are rendered temporarily less accessible (MacLeod, 1999).
Given that dissociated memories are thought to be encoded and
should consequently remain in storage, but not be amenable to
retrieval (Kihlstrom, 2006; van der Hart et al., 2006), studies
employing list-wise DF provide a more definitive test of the
presumed underlying mechanisms of dissociation. Although some
investigators have proposed that retrieval inhibition might be re-
sponsible for deficits in traumatic memory (Anderson & Green,
2001), others have argued that the detrimental effects of dissoci-
ation on memory stem from avoidant information processing.
Thus, dissociation may also accompany an increased ability to
selectively forget or discard information on a conscious level
(Cloitre, 1992). Accordingly, the cognitive avoidance hypothesis is
best investigated by means of item-wise DF.
Dissociative disorders. By using item-wise DF, Elzinga et al.
(2000, Study 2) investigated whether DID and heightened disso-
ciative tendencies are associated with an increased ability to banish
material from consciousness. The authors employed neutral, threat,
and sexual words to compare the DF performance of a group of
DID patients (n  14), an undergraduate low dissociation group
(n  23), and an undergraduate high dissociation group (n  20).
The researchers found that both patients and high dissociators
displayed an inability to forget material when instructed to do so.
This inability was most pronounced for sexual words, suggesting
that patients and high dissociators are not characterized by a
cognitive avoidance strategy but rather by a “higher general ability
to elaborate” (Elzinga et al., 2000, p. 292).
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To extend their prior findings, Elzinga et al. (2003) tested 12
DID patients with neutral and emotional stimuli by using the
item-wise DF paradigm. The patients responded to an implicit and
explicit memory test both in the same and in a purportedly am-
nestic identity state. In line with Elzinga et al. (2000), when tested
in the same identity state, patients with DID exhibited no DF effect
(i.e., failure to forget). Moreover, in the amnestic state, patients
exhibited selective forgetting of to-be-forgotten words but not
to-be-remembered words. Implicit memory was preserved.
Other samples. Cloitre et al. (1996) investigated the link be-
tween dissociation and cognitive avoidance in terms of DF per-
formance. By using positive, negative, and neutral stimuli, these
researchers employed an item-wise DF procedure with the follow-
ing subsamples: (a) 24 patients with borderline personality disor-
der and a history of childhood abuse, (b) 24 patients with border-
line personality disorder but no history of childhood abuse, and (c)
24 nonsymptomatic control participants. Patients with an abuse
history exhibited higher levels of dissociation and superior mem-
ory performance for to-be-remembered words rather than of en-
hanced forgetting for to-be-forgotten words. Moreover, dissocia-
tion levels, as measured by the DES, were significantly related to
recall of to-be-remembered words (r  .24) across all groups.
Thus, higher levels of dissociation were related to superior recall
of to-be-remembered words, rather than to superior forgetting (i.e.,
dissociative amnesia). In another study using item-wise DF, El-
zinga et al. (2000, Study 1) investigated the relationship between
dissociative tendencies and DF performance. The researchers com-
pared undergraduate students who scored high (n  17) and low
(n  18) on dissociation with respect to their performance on a DF
task involving emotionally neutral words. In line with their previ-
ous findings with DID patients, and those of Cloitre et al. (1996),
high dissociators failed to selectively forget to-be-forgotten words.
DePrince and Freyd (2001, 2004) argued that attentional context
(selective vs. divided attention) may be an important determinant
of whether trauma-related information is impaired. As noted ear-
lier, they reasoned that high dissociators may display an advantage
during divided-attention conditions. To explore this hypothesis,
DePrince and Freyd (2004) employed a list-wise DF task but
complemented it with both a selective-attention condition and a
divided-attention condition (i.e., participants were instructed to
push a button whenever the color of the background changed).
Using both neutral and trauma-related words, the investigators
studied the extent to which undergraduates who scored high
(n  21) and low (n  24) on the DES were able to forget (i.e.,
dissociate) trauma words. Their results indicated that, under dual
task conditions, high dissociators tend to recall fewer trauma
words (i.e., superior forgetting) and thus seem to be superior in
dividing their attention compared with low dissociators (for a
similar pattern of findings using item-wise DF, see DePrince &
Freyd, 2001).
However, Devilly et al. (2007) failed to replicate DePrince and
Freyd’s (2001) findings in two samples of undergraduates. How-
ever, Devilly and coworkers have found increased memory falli-
bility in high dissociators, as demonstrated by lower general recall
and, in one study, a heightened tendency to produce commission
errors. High dissociators’ lowered recall is reminiscent of a study
by Holtgraves and Stockdale (1997), who found higher dissocia-
tion levels to be related to poorer recall for both positive and
negative emotion words. When Devilly et al. (2007) used a meta-
analytic approach and combined the data from their two studies
with data from DePrince and Freyd’s (2001, 2004) two studies, the
integrated dataset did not yield the critical pattern of results.
Specifically, high dissociators did not remember fewer trauma
words than neutral words under divided-attention conditions as
compared with low dissociators (for a comment, see DePrince,
Freyd, & Malle, 2007; for a response by the authors, see Devilly
& Ciorciari, 2007). Relying on more clinically relevant samples of
women who reported either continuous or recovered memories of
sexual childhood abuse, and women who reported no abuse his-
tory, McNally et al. (2005) were similarly unable to replicate
DePrince and Freyd’s (2004) list-wise DF findings. Taken to-
gether, Devilly et al.’s (2007) and McNally et al.’s (2005) findings
have cast doubt on the robustness of high dissociators’ capability
to selectively forget emotional information under conditions of
divided attention.
In sum, studies using the DF paradigm in both clinical and
nonclinical samples have largely failed to find evidence for either
(a) an excessive avoidant processing style or (b) a superior ability
to exclude information from consciousness in high dissociators or
participants with dissociative disorders (but see DePrince & Freyd,
2001, 2004). Most evidence seems to point in the opposite direc-
tion, with dissociation being linked to an inability to forget or
ignore stimulus words, especially those that are emotional. Thus,
studies using DF in dissociation have failed to provide compelling
evidence for one of the core assumptions of the traditional view of
dissociation, namely that patients with dissociative disorders or
individuals who report many dissociative symptoms should dis-
play gaps in memory for emotional material (i.e., dissociative
amnesia). Theoretically, finding enhanced recall rather than
avoidant encoding or poor recall of emotional stimulus words
makes sense because it can be related to the breakdown of cogni-
tive inhibition under conditions of emotional arousal in DID (cf.
supra).
Specificity and Fragmentation of Autobiographical
Memories
Another core assumption of the trauma-dissociation view, one
that is particularly well represented in the clinical literature, is that
dissociative individuals’ memories become fragmented or disor-
ganized in the face of emotional material. This assumption concurs
with some trauma victims’ complaints of difficulties in recalling
the temporal order of events (e.g., van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995)
and self-reported memory disturbances of patients with DID (van
der Hart, Bolt, & van der Kolk, 2005) and DPD (Simeon, Hwu, &
Knutelska, 2007). Thus, one may expect dissociation to go along
with reduced specificity of autobiographical memories (i.e., over-
general memories; Williams & Scott, 1988). Typically, researchers
measure the specificity of autobiographical memory by providing
participants with positive, neutral, and negative cue words (e.g.,
successful, lonely, friend) and instructing them to describe a spe-
cific autobiographical memory response to the cue word. When
participants can describe a memory of an event that occurred
within a restricted period (e.g., a day or an evening), the memory
is classified as specific. However, when the memory response
involves a category of events (e.g., “when I go swimming”), or a
broad time period (e.g., “when I was young”), the memory is said
to be overgeneral.
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Dissociative disorders. No studies to date have investigated
autobiographical memory specificity or fragmentation by using
objective measures in the dissociative disorders.
Other samples. Harvey, Bryant, and Dang (1998) examined
the link between overgeneral memories and dissociation in patients
with acute stress disorder (ASD; n  12) and nonsymptomatic
control participants (n  12). ASD manifests itself within the 1st
month after a trauma in symptoms of re-experiencing, avoidance,
and hyperarousal, and its diagnosis requires that dissociative
symptoms are present. The researchers found that individuals with
more severe dissociative symptomatology exhibited less specific
autobiographical memories (i.e., overgeneral memories; r  .45).
Jones et al. (1999) showed that dissociative symptomatology pre-
dicted overgeneral memories in patients (n  23) with borderline
personality disorder (r  .39). When the investigators analyzed the
results in terms of the valence of the cue words, they discovered
that the effect was carried by negative cue words but not by neutral
or positive words. The finding that negative cue words were
associated with less specific memories tentatively supports the
notion that a dissociative information-processing style undermines
encoding or retrieval of specific autobiographical memories.
Thus, Harvey et al. (1998) and Jones et al. (1999) found disso-
ciation to be related to lack of autobiographical memory specific-
ity. However, Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs, and Weisbrod (2005)
investigated this link in patients with borderline personality disor-
der (n  30), depression (n  27), and nonsymptomatic control
participants (n 30), and Kremers, Spinhoven, and van der Does
(2004) examined this association in a sample of borderline per-
sonality disorder patients (N  83). Both studies found no indica-
tion that dissociation is associated with reduced autobiographical
memory specificity. Moreover, Kremers, Spinhoven, van der
Does, and van Dijk (2006) reported that changes in autobiograph-
ical memory specificity did not parallel treatment-related reduction
in dissociative symptoms in a sample of borderline personality
disorder patients (N  55).
The two studies (Harvey et al., 1998; Jones et al., 1999) that did
find a relationship between a lack of autobiographical memory
specificity and dissociation focused on individuals who suffered
not only from dissociative symptoms but from a broad range of
psychopathological symptoms (i.e., depressive symptoms). Co-
morbidity is an important potential confound insofar as depressive
symptoms and intrusions of traumatic memories are known to
contribute independently to reduced autobiographical memory
specificity (Wessel, Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002). Thus, the
extent to which high dissociative patients suffer from comorbid
conditions like depression might explain why researchers some-
times, but not always, find that dissociation is associated with a
lack of autobiographical memory specificity.
To minimize the contribution of co-occurring psychopathology,
Wessel, Merckelbach, Kessels, and Horselenberg (2001) compared
undergraduates who scored high (n  23) or low (n  23) on the
DES to determine whether dissociation and lack of autobiograph-
ical memory specificity are linked. Contrary to Harvey et al.
(1998) and Jones et al. (1999), and in line with Kremers et al.
(2004) and Renneberg et al. (2005), Wessel et al. (2001) were
unable to find evidence for a lack of autobiographical memory
specificity in high dissociators (Cohen’s d  0.13). Accordingly,
in clinical samples, when researchers find an association between
dissociation and overgeneral autobiographical memory, it may be
attributable to comorbid symptoms of depression or intrusions.
In three studies, investigators attempted to study directly the link
between memory fragmentation and dissociation in the laboratory
(Kindt & van den Hout, 2003; Kindt, van den Hout, & Buck,
2005). Kindt and van den Hout (2003, N  40) and Kindt et al.
(2005; Study 1: N  50; Study 2: N  50) examined whether
dissociative tendencies and state-like dissociation (i.e., peri-
traumatic dissociation) are related to memory fragmentation for
material contained in a highly emotional video. As expected,
individuals who reported that they engaged in extensive dissocia-
tion during the video reported more memory fragmentation com-
pared with individuals who dissociated less during the video.
These findings accord with trauma victims’ reports about their
own memory functioning. In addition to their subjective measure
of memory fragmentation, the researchers quantified memory frag-
mentation objectively with a sequential memory task (Wegner,
Quillian, & Houston, 1996). During this task, participants are
given short clips from an emotional video and are asked to sort
them into the right order. Although the investigators determined
that state-like dissociation was related to subjective fragmentation,
it was unrelated to the objective measure of memory fragmenta-
tion. Thus, in this study, memory fragmentation was limited to
meta-memory (i.e., ideas that people have about their memories).
Also, dissociative tendencies, as measured by the DES, were
unrelated to subjective or objective memory fragmentation, sug-
gesting that the findings of Kind and van den Hout (2003) and
Kind et al. (2005) bear little relevance to patients who experience
trait dissociation. Germane to this issue are also studies (Berntsen,
Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Geraerts et al., 2007; Porter & Birt, 2001)
indicating that trauma victims’ memories of their trauma are not
fragmented when compared with either memories of positive life
events (Porter & Birt, 2001) or neutral memories (Geraerts et al.,
2007).
Inter-Identity Amnesia
The most extreme manifestation of memory fragmentation is
dissociative amnesia between identity states in DID. Dissociative
amnesia is defined as the “inability to recall important personal
information that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary
forgetfulness” (criterion C; American Psychiatric Association,
1994, p. 487). Inter-identity amnesia is thought to reflect a severe
disruption in autobiographical memory retrieval, encoding, or both
(J. G. Allen, Console, & Lewis, 1999). Putnam, Guroff, Silberman,
Barban, and Post (1986) conducted a systematic case review
among therapists (N  100). Each therapist reported on one case
of DID, and 98% of the therapists affirmed instances of amnesia in
their DID patients. Moreover, case studies of DID have seemed to
support the existence of amnesia on explicit memory tasks (Bryant,
1995; Larmore, Ludwig, & Cain, 1977; Ludwig, Brandsma, Wil-
bur, Bendfeldt, & Jameson, 1972; Nissen, Ross, Willingham,
Mackenzie, & Schacter, 1988; Schacter, Kihlstrom, Kihlstrom, &
Berren, 1989).
Generally, both case studies and experimental studies of inter-
identity transfer of knowledge have employed the following design
(e.g., Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 1997b). Participants
with DID first learn stimulus material in one identity state. Sub-
sequently, they are asked to access, or to “switch” into, a different
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identity state, and when they report amnesia for the learned stim-
ulus material, recall tests are administered. Patients who report
conscious knowledge of practicing the material are typically ex-
cluded from the analyses.
By using this approach, Bryant (1995) found that a patient with
DID demonstrated no memory for events after the age of 12 when
tested in a child-like identity state but normal memory perfor-
mance when tested in an adult identity state. In line with this case
study, Schacter et al. (1989) reported on a patient with DID who
when tested in one identity state, which supposedly emerged
during adolescence, displayed profound amnesia for the first 14
years of her life. As both case studies were unable to corroborate
reported memories objectively, it is important to note that Nissen
et al. (1988) reported similar findings in a case study of a patient
with DID using standardized explicit learning tasks (e.g., old–new
discrimination).
In contrast, case studies using implicit memory paradigms cast
a more complicated picture. Some case studies indicate that im-
plicit memory transfer is intact in DID (Dick-Barnes, Nelson, &
Aine, 1987; Ludwig et al., 1972; Silberman, Putnam, Weingartner,
Braun, & Post, 1985), whereas Nissen et al. (1988) showed that the
“implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient
condition for demonstrating interpersonality access” (p. 117). Spe-
cifically, implicit memory transfer was intact with simple stimulus
material (e.g., sequence learning), but not in tasks with rich stim-
ulus materials (e.g., Wechsler Memory Scales stories). In line with
these case studies, Eich et al. (1997b) demonstrated priming ef-
fects across identity states for picture-fragment completion, but not
for word stem completion, in a sample of nine patients with DID
(but see M. L. Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & van der Hart,
1998). Interestingly, this pattern of findings could not be readily
mimicked by a sample of nine simulators (Eich, Macaulay, Loe-
wenstein, & Dihle, 1997a). However, strong inferences from the
aforementioned studies are precluded by their small sample sizes.
By using large samples, Huntjens and coworkers (e.g., Huntjens,
Peters, Woertman, van der Hart, & Postma, 2007; Huntjens,
Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2003) investigated the
transfer of implicit knowledge between identity states in a series of
studies. In all studies, they tested not only DID patients but also
nonsymptomatic individuals, and participants were instructed to
simulate DID and its concomitant memory impairments (i.e., sim-
ulators). The latter group was included to investigate possible
symptom production, exaggeration, or both, in DID (Lilienfeld et
al., 1999; Merckelbach, Devilly, & Rassin, 2002; Spanos, 1994).
Obviously, investigating transfer of implicit memory between
identity states is relevant only in the context of (reported) impair-
ment in explicit memory. That is why Huntjens and coworkers
(2007, 2003) limited their analyses to DID patients who denied
possessing explicit memory for the learning experience and the
stimulus material learned in a different identity state.
In their first study, Huntjens et al. (2002) administered implicit
memory tests (i.e., perceptual and conceptual priming tasks) to
patients with DID (n  31), nonsymptomatic individuals (n  25),
and simulators (n  25). Of the patients, 25, 29, and 26 with DID
denied conscious knowledge of the learning experience (i.e., ex-
plicit memory) in the perceptual priming, the conceptual priming,
and the word stem completion task, respectively. Nevertheless,
these patients displayed normal implicit memory performance.
Similarly, simulators were unable to feign inter-identity amnesia
on implicit memory tasks.
In another study (Huntjens et al., 2003), patients with DID
(n  31), nonsymptomatic patients (n  25), and simulators
(n  25) learned a word list containing words from three different
semantic categories (i.e., names of flowers, vegetables, and ani-
mals) in one identity state (Identity 1). Next, patients were asked
to change to another identity state (Identity 2), and all participants
learned another very similar list (i.e., List 2) consisting of words
from the same three categories. After an interval, participants
underwent a recognition test consisting of all words from List 1
and List 2 and filler words in Identity 2. Recognition performance
did not differ between patients with DID who denied conscious
knowledge of the learning experiences (n  23) and nonsymptom-
atic control participants. Thus, both groups exhibited the normal
pattern of interference between Lists 1 and 2. Apparently, DID
patients had access to the List 1 words, although they reported
being amnestic for the learning experience when in Identity 2.
The studies discussed above relied on emotionally neutral stim-
ulus material. However, it is often assumed that emotionally neg-
ative material is more likely to lead to compartmentalization of
memory (Putnam, 1995). Importantly, in another study, Huntjens
et al. (2007) demonstrated that the standard retroactive interference
effect is not limited to DID patients learning emotionally neutral
stimulus material in their amnestic state. Researchers have re-
ported similar findings for the transfer of procedural information
(Huntjens, Postma, Woertman, van der Hart, & Peters, 2005) and
stimulus valence (Huntjens, Peters, et al., 2005) from one inter-
identity state to the other.
In sum, Huntjens and coworkers’ studies (Huntjens, Postma, et
al., 2005; Huntjens et al., 2006, 2007, 2002, 2003; Huntjens,
Peters, et al., 2005) showed that a substantial majority of patients
with DID report no transfer of explicit memory between person-
ality states but show intact implicit memory between identity states
across a wide range of implicit memory tasks. Moreover, transfer
of implicit memory does not seem to be influenced by stimulus
valence. Mixed findings in earlier studies probably have been due
to their very limited sample sizes.
Although studies of inter-identity amnesia in DID typically
exclude DID participants who report memory of the learning
experience, explicit memory of the stimulus material is assessed
solely by self-report. However, self-reported lack of memory
transfer between identity states may be prone to learned sociocog-
nitive responses. With this in mind, participants may have learned
to behave in a way that is consistent with their idea of DID
(Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007; Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Therefore, the
veracity of explicit memory inaccessibility should be verified
independently of self-report (J. J. B. Allen & Movius, 2000).
Laboratory research on inter-identity memory performance in
DID, which quantifies explicit memory independent of self-
reported deficits, might therefore more fully inform us about
memory processes underlying dissociative amnesia. That is why
Huntjens et al. (2006) administered a multiple-choice recognition
test for a story learned in a different identity state to patients with
DID (n  22), nonsymptomatic participants (n  25), and simu-
lators (n  25). This type of recognition task is regularly employed
to detect malingering of (explicit) memory problems in forensic
settings, as malingerers tend to avoid correct answers and therefore
perform below chance (Denny, 1999). As in previous studies, the
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majority of their patients with DID (n  19) denied any knowl-
edge of the learning experience. Yet strikingly, they performed
below chance on the recognition task. Consequently, these patients
did make use of the memory learned in the other identity state
when determining their answers and deliberately avoided correct
alternatives. Thus, the authors concluded “DID patients were
found not to be characterized by an actual [explicit] memory
retrieval inability, in contrast to their subjective reports” (Huntjens
et al., 2006, p. 857).
In sum, studies investigating inter-identity amnesia in DID using
laboratory tasks rather than self-report measures have consistently
failed to find any objective evidence for inter-identity amnesia in
spite of subjectively reported amnesia (for a review, see Dorahy &
Huntjens, 2007). Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that inter-
identity amnesia is a meta-memory phenomenon rather than an
objectively measurable memory impairment.
Commission Errors in the Lab (but No Amnesia)
Researchers have examined possible memory deficits in disso-
ciation, including commission errors in terms of two types of
memory errors: incomplete recall, also referred to as omission
errors, and false recall, also referred to as commission errors.
Amnesia can be conceptualized as a profound form of memory
omission (Holmes et al., 2005). The question of the strength of
evidence for omission errors in dissociation arises because amne-
sia is widely regarded as one of the core features of dissociation.
Dissociative disorders. Montagne et al. (2007) investigated
memory performance for emotional stimulus material. Specifi-
cally, patients with DPD (n  12) and nonsymptomatic individu-
als (n  20) viewed 11 picture slides accompanied by an emo-
tional narrative (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995). The researchers found
that patients’ and control participants’ memory performance was
equivalent with respect to central, peripheral, and emotional details
of the stimulus materials. However, the authors did not assess
commission errors in both groups.
Other samples. Researchers have shown repeatedly that dis-
sociation increases the risk of commission errors. For example,
Hyman and Billings (1998; see also Ost, Foster, Costall, & Bull,
2005; Ost, Granhag, Udell, & Hjelmsater, 2008; Porter, Birt,
Yuille, & Lehman, 2000) questioned undergraduates (N  48)
about veridical childhood events that were supplied by their par-
ents and also about a false event, presented to participants as if
they were based on information provided by parents. Individuals
with heightened levels of dissociation were more likely to report
elaborate memories for the false event (r  .48). Interestingly, in
another study (Ost, Fellows, & Bull, 1997; N  36), high disso-
ciators, compared with low dissociators, were more confident in
fabricated, but not veridical, autobiographical memories.
Merckelbach, Muris, Horselenberg, and Stougie (2000) exam-
ined the links between the DES and confabulation in two studies.
In the first study, undergraduates (N  42) viewed a series of 40
slides. Twenty were pictures of common objects or situations,
whereas the other 20 consisted of a short paragraph describing an
object or a situation. Ten of the latter were related to slides shown
previously. Fifteen minutes later, a surprise recognition task fol-
lowed. This task consisted of items that had been presented pre-
viously (old items) and new items. The participants had to say
whether each item was old or new, and when they said it was old,
they indicated whether they had seen it as a picture or as a
paragraph. Participants could commit two types of errors: (a)
misidentifying a paragraph as a photograph, or vice versa (i.e.,
reality monitoring errors); and (b) false positive responses (i.e.,
confabulation). Heightened dissociation levels were associated
with a tendency to classify new items as old (r  .39). Thus, high
dissociators were more likely to claim having seen a picture that
was not present during the study stage, which can be seen as a form
of confabulatory responding. Increased dissociation levels were
not accompanied by a heightened tendency to commit reality
monitoring errors. Two other studies also failed to find a relation-
ship between reality monitoring errors and dissociation (Koppen-
haver, Kumar, & Pekala, 1997; N  220; van den Hout, Merck-
elbach, & Pool, 1996; N  60), whereas a third study found that
individuals with a heightened tendency to dissociate took longer to
discriminate perception from vivid imagery (Kunzendorf &
Karpen, 1997; N  141).
Merckelbach, Zeles, van Bergen, and Giesbrecht (2007) second
study provided additional evidence for an association between the
tendency to confabulate and dissociation. The researchers asked 70
participants to complete the Life Events Inventory (Cochrane &
Robertson, 1973), a questionnaire consisting of 60 items describ-
ing 20 negative, 20 positive, and 20 neutral childhood events. The
items were detailed descriptions of specific experiences (e.g., “I
went to Disneyland with my school.”). Respondents were asked to
indicate on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely did not
happen) to 7 (definitely did happen) how certain they were that
they had experienced each event before the age of 10. Of course,
many respondents will actually have experienced some of the
events, and if dissociation does in fact arise from exposure to
traumatic events, then one would expect high dissociators to report
more negative events. Nevertheless, participants’ endorsement of a
large number of positive and negative as well as neutral events
may reflect a tendency to confabulate. In this study, a significant
correlation of r  .39 between the DES and a positive answering
bias on the Life Events Inventory emerged. This correlation,
however, disappeared when the influence of fantasy proneness was
partialled out statistically. This study provides further support for
the idea that individuals with a high frequency of dissociative
experiences more readily endorse descriptions of events of differ-
ing affective valence due to a positive response bias linked to
fantasy proneness. However, the precise causal status of fantasy
proneness remains unclear.
A closely related line of research consists of studies reporting a
heightened tendency for high dissociators to produce commission
errors in paradigms relying on narratives (Candel, Merckelbach, &
Kuijpers, 2003), video fragments (Giesbrecht, Geraerts, & Merck-
elbach, 2007), and staged events (Merckelbach, Zeles, et al.,
2007). Interestingly, another consistent finding in these studies is
that high dissociators’ memory performance does not differ from
that of low dissociators in terms of hits or the amount of accurate
information produced. Sandberg, Lynn, and Matorin (2001) deter-
mined that high dissociators do not exhibit degraded recall of
danger cues from a video of a potential sexual assault (see also
Candel et al., 2003; Giesbrecht, Geraerts, & Merckelbach, 2007).
This finding implies that it is unlikely that the dissociation–
commission error relationship can be accounted for by gap filling,
as a result of a deficient memory for emotional material (i.e.,
dissociative amnesia).
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In two studies, Merckelbach, Zeles, et al. (2007) further inves-
tigated the dissociation–commission error link. In the first study,
they examined whether individuals high on dissociation might be
prone to relax their retrieval criteria, which in turn might increase
their susceptibility to commission errors. The researchers surprised
36 undergraduates with a staged event followed by four subse-
quent free recall tasks. Briefly, Merckelbach, Zeles, et al. (2007)
found that repeated retrieval attempts led to an increase in com-
mission errors in participants irrespective of dissociation status.
This increase in commission errors is a well-replicated finding
closely related to the output-order effect (Schwartz, Fisher, &
Hebert, 1998). Thus, participants seem to relax their retrieval
criterion to increase their memory output after being prompted for
more information, but this output-order effect in itself is not related
to dissociation. In fact, dissociation was related to an overall
tendency to commit commission errors.
In a second study (N  60), these authors investigated whether
fragmented or disorganized encoding accounts for the
dissociation–commission link. Participants watched a video that
depicted a severe but nonfatal car accident. Participants watched
the video fragment while the experimenters presented a series of
high and low frequency tones, with half of the participants in-
structed to perform an oddball task (i.e., dual task condition).
These participants were asked to watch the video while counting
all the low tones. It was hypothesized that due to their tendency to
encode information in a shallow or superficial manner, high dis-
sociators’ memory should be more easily disrupted by this dual
task than should low dissociators’ memory. The dissociation–
commission link was apparent in the selective–attention condition
but not the dual task condition. This result is reminiscent of
DePrince and Freyd’s (1999) finding that low dissociators are
more susceptible to the attention-disrupting effect of a dual task
condition than are high dissociators. Although Merckelbach, Zeles,
et al.’s (2007) two attempts to identify the cognitive mechanisms
responsible for high dissociators’ tendencies to produce memory
commission errors were largely unsuccessful, there was tentative
evidence that this link is mediated at least partly by fantasy
proneness (Giesbrecht, Geraerts, & Merckelbach, 2007; but see
Candel et al., 2003).
A number of researchers have examined how dissociation re-
lates to false recognition errors on the Deese–Roediger–
McDermott (DRM) memory illusion task. In general, many par-
ticipants falsely recognize nonpresented words (i.e., critical lures)
that are thematically associated with studied word lists. Winograd,
Peluso, and Glover (1998) reported that DES scores were posi-
tively related to remember judgments for nonpresented, themati-
cally related words on the DRM task (r  .34; for a similar
finding, see Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman,
2002). However, contrary to the findings of Winograd et al.
(1998), studies by Wright, Startup, and Mathews (2005), Platt,
Lacey, Iobst, and Finkelman (1998), and Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic,
van Heerden, and Merckelbach (2005) failed to find evidence for
a significant relation between the DES and false recognition of the
critical lures on the DRM task, although Geraerts et al. (2005) did
find that dissociation predicted the false recall of unstudied neutral
and emotional words other than the critical lure.
Imagination inflation is another widely used paradigm for study-
ing false memories in the laboratory (Garry, Manning, Loftus, &
Sherman, 1996). In this paradigm, participants are first asked to
rate the probability that they have experienced various childhood
events. In a second session, weeks later, they are asked to create
detailed images of childhood events that they previously rated as
improbable. Imagining these events increases participants’ confi-
dence that they actually occurred (i.e., imagination inflation).
Paddock et al. (1998) showed that dissociative symptoms predicted
the magnitude of the imagination inflation effect in undergraduates
(N  98). Heaps and Nash (1999) replicated this finding, whereas
Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) showed that dissociation was related
to changes in remember–know judgments after imagination in a
theoretically meaningful way (e.g., more remember judgments
after imagination in high DES persons). However, Horselenberg et
al. (2000) found that heightened levels of dissociation were not
associated with a larger imagination inflation effect. These authors
speculated that dissociation is related primarily to eccentricity of
false memories. Hence, dissociation may go along with more
bizarre false memories rather than a higher frequency thereof (see
also Spanos, 1994). Horselenberg et al. (2000) also argued that the
imagination inflation effect might reflect a meta-memory phenom-
enon. Participants might change their beliefs about an event’s
probability rather than developing a false memory of it. This
account implies that the imagination inflation procedure taps other
mechanisms (e.g., meta-memory beliefs) than do the standard
memory tasks in which dissociation is reliably related to the
susceptibility of commission errors.
Putnam (1997) observed that because dissociative individuals
exhibit subjective memory problems and lack confidence in their
recollections, they are vulnerable to the misinformation effect.
Eisen and Carlson (1998) and Eisen, Morgan, and Mickes (2002)
examined the relation between dissociation and errors in response
to misleading information. In these studies, college students took
part in a staged event and returned 1 week later to complete a
structured interview that included both highly suggestive, mislead-
ing questions, and factual, nonsuggestive questions about the
event. In each study, pathological dissociation, as measured by the
DES–T, was significantly related to errors in response to mislead-
ing questions (for a similar finding, see K. Wilson & French, 2006;
but see Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001). In both studies, neither
overall DES scores nor DES–T scores were related to errors on the
specific, nonsuggestive questions.
In summary, there is a fairly consistent, yet small-to-moderate,
link between dissociation and commission errors in studies across
a variety of paradigms. The most notable exception to this pattern
comes from studies using the DRM paradigm. The generally
negative results from these studies may be due to the fact that false
recognition on the DRM task is more fundamentally related to
encoding errors (see Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998, for
a review) and is less sensitive to a tendency to react with atypical
responses or to errors due to the explicit misinformation (Eisen &
Lynn, 2001). Thus, the dissociation–commission error link may be
caused primarily by difficulties in withholding atypical responses
and therefore typically emerges in paradigms that expose partici-
pants to misleading information.
Recently, laboratory studies using paradigms such as the DRM
procedure and imagination inflation to elicit false memories have
been criticized because “flawed memories and false memories are
not the same thing, nor are identical cognitive processes likely to
underlie the two” (Pezdek & Lam, 2007, p. 7). These critics argued
that only when entire new events have been successfully implanted
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can one speak of a genuine false memory. Thus, high dissociators’
memories might well be susceptible to the incorporation of minor
flaws rather than the implantation of completely fictitious events.
Indeed, most studies showed that high dissociators exhibit com-
mission errors that pertain to details (e.g., Candel et al., 2003).
However, Hyman and Billings (1998) demonstrated convincingly
that high dissociators are also more prone to develop entire false
memories, such as a memory of having knocked over a punch bowl
at a wedding as a child. Further evidence for this conclusion has
come from studies that investigated the personality profiles of
individuals who reported having been abducted by aliens (Mc-
Nally et al., 2004), or who claim to have memories of previous
lives (M. J. Peters, Horselenberg, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2007).
These studies have offered existence proofs for the idea that
individuals with elevated levels of dissociation are especially
prone to report extremely unlikely events.
To recapitulate, although it is often assumed that increased
levels of dissociation are associated with omission errors (the
kinds of errors one would expect to find in dissociative amnesia),
this assumption lacks empirical support. Instead, accumulating
evidence has indicated that dissociation is linked to memory com-
mission errors (i.e., false memories). These findings have under-
scored why it is problematic to rely on uncorroborated reports of
traumatic childhood experiences as evidence for a link between
dissociation and traumatic experiences, including sexual abuse
(e.g., Gleaves & Eberenz, 1995). At least some of these reports
may reflect inaccurate memories.
Dissociation and Trauma
The literature on cognitive processes involved in dissociation
has provided scant evidence for deficits in autobiographical mem-
ory (e.g., compartmentalization, psychogenic amnesia) or avoidant
information processing that would be expected to enable trauma
victims to alleviate the impact of (recurrent) traumatic events. Yet
advocates of this defensive function of dissociative experiences
frequently cite positive correlations between measures of dissoci-
ation and retrospective self-reports of traumatic events as evidence
for a direct causal link between trauma and dissociation (e.g.,
Holmes et al., 2005; van der Hart et al., 2006). Although a
comprehensive review of the literature on the relationship between
trauma and dissociation is beyond the scope of the present article,
recent reviews investigating this matter systematically have ar-
rived to the conclusion that “there is no good evidence for a
traumatic etiology of DID or any other dissociative disorder”
(Kihlstrom, 2005, p. 14; see also Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Merckel-
bach & Muris, 2001).
Briefly, studies addressing the relationship between dissociation
and trauma have nearly universally relied on retrospective self-
report of traumatic events. Moreover, the few longitudinal studies
of dissociation that have been published have relied on nonrepre-
sentative samples (Goodman et al., 2003; Macfie, Cicchetti, &
Toth, 2001; Ogawa, Sroufe, Weinfield, Carlson, & Egeland, 1997).
Thus, there is not a single epidemiological study of (verified)
trauma and dissociation involving a sample of participants repre-
sentative of the general population. What makes reliance on self-
report measures particularly problematic when investigating the
trauma–dissociation link is that individuals with dissociative ten-
dencies frequently endorse a wide range of common psychopatho-
logical symptoms (Valdiserri & Kihlstrom, 1995a, 1995b) and
bizarre experiences and atypical symptoms (Giesbrecht & Merck-
elbach, 2006a) on the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symp-
tomatology (Smith & Burger, 1997), which even psychiatric pa-
tients rarely endorse (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). Dissociation
thus covaries with a positive response bias (R. C. Johnson, Edman,
& Danko, 1995; Merckelbach & Jelicic, 2004) and a tendency to
commit commission errors in memory (cf. supra).
Research based on objective indices of trauma also has failed to
substantiate a direct and robust association between trauma and
dissociation (Cima et al., 2001; B. Sanders & Giolas, 1991). In
both the study by B. Sanders and Giolas (1991) and the study by
Cima et al. (2001), a researcher blind to the dissociative status of
the participants scored hospital records for more objective indica-
tions of trauma. In both studies, this analysis yielded a nonsignif-
icant and, more important, slightly negative correlation between
ratings of traumatic experiences based on hospital records and
dissociation (Sanders & Giolas, 1991, r  –.21; Cima et al., 2001,
r  –.13). Moreover, most research on trauma and dissociation has
failed to control for potentially confounding factors, including
family pathology, general psychological distress, and specific vari-
ants of psychopathology associated with dissociation, such as
eating disorders, impulsivity (van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996),
and schizotypal traits (e.g., Merckelbach & Giesbrecht, 2006;
Merckelbach, Rassin, & Muris, 2000; C. A. Pope & Kwapil,
2000).
Conclusion
Several important conclusions can be drawn from our review.
Studies of the link between dissociation and trauma are largely
retrospective and do not justify the widely accepted idea that
trauma and dissociation are causally related to each other (see also
Kihlstrom, 2005). In addition, dissociation overlaps robustly with
fantasy proneness, interrogative suggestibility, and susceptibility
to cognitive failures, which may undermine the accuracy of retro-
spective reports of traumatic experiences. Additionally, research
based on more objective indices of trauma (e.g., medical records or
prospective methods) fails to substantiate a direct and solid rela-
tionship between trauma and dissociation.
In general, patients with dissociative disorders evidence subtle
deficits in neuropsychological performance, although their overall
cognitive functioning is unremarkable. More specifically, DID
appears to be associated with fluctuating performance (i.e., subtest
scatter), whereas DPD is related to subtle deficits in early stages of
information processing.
The extant literature regarding dissociation and memory span is
inconclusive. Some studies have found that high and low disso-
ciative individuals exhibit similar working memory performance;
others have found that highly dissociative participants exhibit
superior performance; and still others have found that high disso-
ciators perform more poorly than do low dissociators. Clearly, this
issue requires clarification. One way to accomplish this goal is to
study how working memory performance is related to different
manifestations of dissociation (i.e, absorption, depersonalization,
and amnesia).
An emerging line of research shows that some of the differences
between high dissociators or individuals with a dissociative disor-
der and low dissociators or nonsymptomatic persons are dependent
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on the emotional or attentional context. More specifically, differ-
ences between high and low dissociators often emerge only when
participants are tested under emotionally negative conditions, and
high dissociators sometimes perform better under divided-
attention conditions than do low dissociators. However, evidence
for high dissociators’ performance advantages under divided-
attention conditions is not robust and requires replication.
A widespread assumption in the clinical literature is that disso-
ciation is associated with avoidant information processing. How-
ever, controlled studies have generally failed to provide evidence
for this belief: Higher levels of dissociation actually seem to be
associated with enhanced retrieval, or less pronounced forgetting
of emotional material. Also, high dissociators tend to develop
pseudo-memories rather than gaps in their memories (i.e., amne-
sia). Furthermore, memory fragmentation reported by high disso-
ciators and DID patients seems to be a subjective meta-memory
phenomenon with no clear-cut objective manifestations.
Based on conceptual grounds, the assumed qualitative differ-
ences between pathological dissociation and nonpathological
dissociation are frequently emphasized (e.g., Moskowitz, 2004;
van der Hart et al., 2006). Proponents of this stance may argue
that most of the findings based on nondissociative disordered
samples may not be relevant to the dissociative disorders given
the profound differences between pathological and nonpatho-
logical dissociation. However, even if one were to exclude all
studies that were not conducted with patients diagnosed with
dissociative disorders, this would not substantially change our
conclusions. Even studies that rely exclusively on samples with
dissociative disorders do not support—and sometimes even
contradict—the assumed cognitive concomitants of dissociation
(e.g., inter-identity amnesia, avoidant information processing,
amnesia for emotional stimuli) when objective measures are
employed.
Nevertheless, one may wonder how well research in nondisso-
ciative disorder samples generalizes to the dissociative disorders.
This question is an empirical one to which our review offers a
provisional answer. Whereas controlled laboratory research in the
dissociative disorders is somewhat limited, two lines of research
are relevant to the issue of generalization because they offer
findings from both dissociative disorder samples and nondissocia-
tive disorder samples by using comparable paradigms. The best
comparison has been offered by Elzinga et al. (2000). These
researchers employed both DID patients and individuals who were
nonpatients yet high dissociators. Across both samples, the DF
effects were comparable. Second, an entire line of research in
nonclinical samples consistently has shown that dissociation is not
associated with inferior emotional memory performance for, for
example, narratives in terms of hits (e.g., Candel et al., 2003). This
finding has recently been replicated in DPD by Montagne et al.
(2007). Thus, the available literature, including N. G. Waller et
al.’s (1996) largely unsuccessful endeavor to discriminate patho-
logical from nonpathological dissociation, has supported the as-
sumption that cognitive findings from nonclinical high dissociators
can be cautiously translated to dissociative disorders. In conclu-
sion, the present review reveals substantial discrepancies between
core assumptions in the clinical literature concerning dissociation
(e.g., avoidant information processing, memory fragmentation)
and systematic findings from cognitive studies.
Future Studies
Researchers interested in dissociative disorders have focused
primarily on the alleged traumatic antecedents of dissociation. In
doing so, many or most have taken for granted that profound
deficits in attention and memory function (e.g., avoidant informa-
tion processing, compartmentalization, psychogenic amnesia) are
core features of dissociation (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Holmes et al.,
2005). However, as our review indicates, controlled studies con-
sistently fail to provide evidence for these and other widely alleged
core features of dissociation. Accordingly, there is a large discrep-
ancy between theoretical notions and empirical findings on disso-
ciation. To begin to close this gap between theory and research, we
propose that the field of dissociation can profit from attention to a
number of relatively neglected domains of research.
For all research lines, it would be beneficial for researchers to
examine different types or expressions of dissociation (e.g., ab-
sorption, depersonalization) in conjunction with fantasy proneness,
cognitive failures, and suggestibility (see also Kihlstrom, 2005).
Moreover, few (nonpatient) studies have included individuals who
score in the middle range of dissociation and are therefore more
typical of the general population than are participants selected for
their extreme high or low scores. It may be worthwhile to include
this middle group, as according to Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum,
and Nicewander (2005), extreme group designs have numerous
disadvantages, including (a) artificially increasing the variance,
often resulting in spuriously inflated effect sizes; (b) assuming
linearity when it may be absent (e.g., middle and highly dissocia-
tive participants may exhibit similar cognitive deficits); and (c)
rendering interpretations of group differences ambiguous (i.e.,
difficulty in delineating whether the obtained effects are due to the
high group’s cognitive deficits, the low group’s superior abilities,
or some mixture of both possibilities). Accordingly, the failure to
include dissociative participants in the normative range could
create the superficial appearance of a distinctly different profile of
deficits or abilities that is more apparent than “real” (Lynn, Kirsch,
Knox, & Lilienfeld, 2006). In addition, most studies employed
measures of trait dissociation only and failed to quantify symptom
fluctuations (i.e., state dissociation). This is probably due to the
assumption that dissociative symptomatology in dissociative dis-
orders is persistent and consistently high in intensity (Sierra &
Berrios, 1998). Whereas measures of trait dissociation like the
DES show very good test–retest stability, little is known about
fluctuations in dissociation levels in dissociative disorders over
shorter time periods, and acute dissociation during task perfor-
mance is not routinely quantified.
Dissociation and Sleep Experiences
An area that is worthy of exploration is the relationship between
dissociation and sleep-related experiences. Indeed, starting with
the pioneering work of Watson (Watson, 2001, 2003b), a number
of recent studies (Giesbrecht, Jongen, Smulders, & Merckelbach,
2006; Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2004, 2006b) have linked dis-
sociative symptoms in undergraduate students to self-reported
sleep anomalies, such as dreams of flying, hypnopompic imagery,
or sensing the presence of someone else. There also has been
anecdotal evidence that symptoms in patients with DPD worsen
when they feel tired. Thus, Simeon and Abugel (2006, p. 210)
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reported that these patients “often liken it to bad jet lag and feel
much worse when they travel across time zones.” Similarly, Ag-
argun et al. (2003) emphasized the importance of nightmares in
DID. Moreover, when healthy undergraduates (N  25) were de-
prived from sleep for 36 hours, dissociative symptoms increased
dramatically and were affected earlier than other measures such as
mood (Giesbrecht, Smeets, Leppink, Jelicic, & Merckelbach,
2007). Thus, there are good empirical reasons to assume that
dissociative symptoms are related to deviant sleep patterns.
This association between sleep-related experiences and dissoci-
ation could help us to understand why dissociation overlaps with
cognitive failures and the tendency to commit commission errors
in memory. Specifically, the fact that disruptions in sleep–wake
patterns exert a detrimental effect on attention (Jewett, Dijk, Kro-
nauer, & Dinges, 1999) could explain why dissociation overlaps
with a susceptibility to cognitive failures. Moreover, if it is the
case that the progression of waking state to rapid eye movement
sleep is marked by an increase in “fluid” and hyperassociative
thinking (Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 2001), it is tempting
to speculate that dreamlike and fantasy intrusions into the waking
state (which are typical for dissociation) interfere with memory
performance and promote commission errors. Indeed, fantasy
proneness and absorption are consistently correlated with both
measures of sleep experiences and dissociation (see Fassler, Knox,
& Lynn, 2006). Studies that examine the correlates of dissociative
symptoms induced by sleep deprivation, and studies directed at
normalizing sleep in dissociative disorders, promise to shed more
light on these possibilities.
The fact that dissociative experiences and deviant sleep phenomena
are linked does not preclude the possibility that early aversive life
experience, including childhood trauma, plays a role in the develop-
ment of dissociative symptoms. Such aversive experiences might play
a distal role, whereas sleep disruptions seem to play a proximal role.
Germane to this issue are studies showing that patients with PTSD
exhibit abnormal sleep phenomena, with the prevalence of nightmares
among patients diagnosed with PTSD ranging up to 70% (Wittmann,
Schredl, & Kramer, 2006). It is, of course, true that deviant sleep
phenomena are not specific to dissociation and are evident in a wide
range of disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders; Benca, Ober-
meyer, Thisted, & Gillin, 1992). However, because there are well-
articulated theories concerning the involvement of sleep in cognitive
function like memory and memory commission errors (Crick &
Mitchison, 1995; Stickgold et al., 2001), the study of dissociation
might profit from a closer look at sleep patterns of high dissociative
individuals.
Pharmacologically Induced Dissociative Symptoms
Certain drugs, notably low doses of the anesthetic ketamine,
produce dream-like states and dissociative symptoms. For exam-
ple, participants in the Krystal et al. (1994) study reported slowing
of time and alterations in the vividness, form, and context of
sensory experiences following the administration of ketamine.
These dissociative experiences may be the byproduct of dimin-
ished NMDA-related neurotransmission (Simeon, 2004). Interest-
ingly, the dissociation-inducing properties of cannabinoids
(Simeon, Knutelska, Nelson, & Guralnik, 2003), such as mari-
juana, may also be mediated via NMDA receptors. Another class
of chemicals that elicits dissociation, and more specifically deper-
sonalization reactions in healthy participants, are the hallucino-
gens, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). The fact that these
chemicals act as agonists of serotonin 5-HT2A and 5-HT2C recep-
tors imply that serotonin also may play a mediational role in
dissociation (Simeon, 2004). If research reveals that drugs with
well-delineated links to neurotransmitter systems produce symp-
toms consistent with dissociative disorders in healthy volunteers, it
could hint at the neurobiological basis of dissociative symptoms.
Studying Cognitive Processes in the Dissociative
Disorders
Only a small number of the studies we review relied on patients
with dissociative disorders. The field would benefit from a thor-
ough cognitive analysis of the dissociative disorders that compares
memory and other cognitive functions and processes across these
disorders. Due to the mixed findings regarding the cognitive mor-
phology of dissociation, it is impossible at the present time to
formulate a well-articulated comprehensive cognitive framework
of this still elusive phenomenon. Yet given the prominent place of
dissociation in clinical psychology and psychiatry, there is an
urgent need for a cognitive analysis of dissociation that includes
patients with dissociative disorders. Such an analysis should not
only advance our understanding of the etiology of dissociation, but
ultimately contribute to the treatment of dissociative disorders.
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(Appendix follows)
Appendix
Table A1. Summary of Studies Examining Cognitive Functioning in Dissociation Using Standardized Laboratory Tasks
Paradigm Study Group Control group
Main finding with respect to
dissociation
Neuropsychological functioning
WAIS Guralnik et
al. (2000)
DPD (n  15) HC (n  15) –No difference on full-scale IQ
–Compromised visual and
verbal short-term memory
WAIS, WMS Guralnik et
al. (2007)
DPD (n  21) HC (n  17) –No difference in full-scale IQ
–Compromised on immediate
visual and verbal recall
Auditory oddball Kirino (2006) DID (n  12) HC (n  12) –Attenuation of P300 amplitude
during dissociative episodes
but recovery to HC levels in
remission
WASI Roca et al.
(2006)
PTSD with DD (n  10) PTSD without DD
(n  17)
–No group differences
WAIS Rossini et al.
1996)
DID (n  50), DDNOS (n  55) –Abnormal intertest scatter
N-letter back task Elzinga et al.
(2007)
DID (n  16) HC (n  16) –Smaller decline in performance
with increasing task load in
DID
IGT, O-SPAN, WCST,
WTAR
Bruce, Ray,
Bruce, et
al. (2007)
High DES (29) undergraduate
students (n  33)
Low DES (6)
undergraduate
students (n  33)
–No group differences
BADS Cima et al.
(2001)
Inmates, psychiatric correctional
institute (n  30)
–Performance deficits on frontal
tasks
Word Span De Ruiter et
al. (2004)
High DIS–Q (M  2.20, n  40)
undergraduates
Low (M  1.24,
n  38) and medium
(M  1.58, n  41)
DIS–Q
undergraduates
–Larger word span
RNG Giesbrecht et
al. (2004)
Undergraduates (N  185) –Subtle disruptions in executive
functioning
DS Papageorgiou
et al.
(2002)
Participants with transient
depersonalization/derealization
symptoms (n  15)
HC (n  15) –Decreased amplitude of P300
during DS
CVLT, TOT Prohl et al.
(2001)
Adolescent psychiatric patients
(N  41)
–Deficits in declarative (i.e.,
CVLT) and procedural (i.e.,
TOT) memory performance
CVLT Stein et al.
(1999)
Adults with a history of CSA
(n  22)
HC (n  20) –Dissociation unrelated to
CVLT performance
Subtests of WAIS Stevens et al.
(2004)
BPD (n  22) HC (n  25) –Dissociation was not
significantly related to any
measure of WM performance
N-letter back task,
letter Sternberg task
Veltman et
al. (2005)
High DIS–Q (M  2.24)
undergraduates (n  11)
Low (M  1.33) DIS–Q
undergraduates
(n  10)
–Superior performance on both
tasks –Greater dorsolateral
(DL) and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (PFC),
parietal cortex, and
supplementary motor area
activation
DS, Visual Patterns
Test, and CBT
Wright &
Osborne
(2005)
Undergraduates (N  80) –Dissociation unrelated to task
performance
Information processing
Flanker task (neutral
words)
Dorahy et al.
(2002)
DID (n  20) MDD, HC (both
ns  20)
–No negative priming in DID
and MDD –DID slower to
respond than HC
Flanker task (digits) Dorahy,
Irwin, &
Middleton
(2004)
DID (n  10) HC, MDD, PTSD,
psychosis (all
ns  10)
–Intact cognitive inhibition
Flanker task (digits),
word naming task
(focal attention and
distracter, neutral and
emotional)
Dorahy et al.
(2006)
DID (n  12) GAD, HC (both
ns  12)
–Negative priming in the
neutral but not negative
condition
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Paradigm Study Group Control group
Main finding with respect to
dissociation
Flanker task (digits) Dorahy,
Middleton,
& Irwin
(2004)
DID (n  10) HC, MDD, PTSD (all
ns  10), psychosis
(n  9)
–Significant negative priming,
comparable with that of
depressed and PTSD
Flanker task (word
stimuli, neutral and
negative context)
Dorahy et al.
(2005)
DID (n  11) MDD, HC (both
ns  11)
–Negative priming in neutral
context, but not in the
negative context –Slower
reaction time (RT) to negative
stimuli
Stroop task (neutral and
emotional, selective
and divided
attention)
DePrince &
Freyd
(1999)
High DES (20) undergraduates
(n  54)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  54)
–More Stroop interference in
high DES group during
selective attention and less
during divided attention –
High DES group exhibited
lower rates of recall emotional
stimuli
Letter detection task,
affective evaluative
task
De Ruiter et
al. (2003)
High DIS–Q (M  2.19)
undergraduates (n  16)
Low (M  1.32) DIS–Q
undergraduates
(n  16)
–Larger valence effect on RTs
and ERPs in the affective
evaluation task –Faster RT
and ERP positivity for
relevant stimuli during letter
detection
Stroop (selective
attention, standard
Stroop stimuli,
kinship, animal,
household, and space
words)
Freyd et al.
(1998)
High DES (20, n  40) Low DES (10, n 40) –Greater level of interference on
the Stroop color-naming task
Thought suppression of
emotional video
fragment
Giesbrecht,
Merckelbach,
& Smeets
(2006)
Undergraduates (N  40) –DES–T related to inferior
suppression performance
Information-processing
task (neutral and
threatening stimuli)
G. Waller et
al. (1995)
Undergraduates (N  105) –Levels of dissociation related
to slowness identifying the
presence of threat words
TNT Wessel et al.
(2005)
High DES (20) undergraduates
(n  35)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  35)
–No group differences in TNT
performance
Directed forgetting
Item-wise, neutral and
emotional, within
and between
personality state),
picture-fragment
completion task
Elzinga et al.
(2003)
DID (N  12) –Directed forgetting between
states, but not within the same
identity state –Reduction of
explicit memory performance
between states –Implicit
memory was preserved
Item-wise, positive,
negative, and neutral
stimuli
Cloitre et al.
(1996)
Patients with BPD and abuse
(n  24), patients with BPD
and abuse, HC (n  24)
–Dissociation across all groups
predicted better recall of to-
be-remembered words
Item-wise, selective and
divided attention,
negative and neutral
stimuli)
DePrince &
Freyd
(2001)
High DES (20) undergraduates
(n  28)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  28)
–Lower recall rate of emotional
and better recall of neutral
words during divided attention
List-wise, selective and
divided attention,
negative, and neutral
stimuli
DePrince &
Freyd
(2004)
High DES (20) undergraduates
(n  21)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  24)
–Lower rates of recall of
emotional stimuli during
divided attention
Item-wise, selective and
divided attention,
neutral and emotional
stimuli
Devilly et al.
(2007)
Study 1: High DES (20)
undergraduates (n  19)
Study 1: Low DES
(10) undergraduates
(n  23)
–Lower recall rates of all stimuli
Study 2: High DES (20)
undergraduates (n  20)
Study 2: Low DES
(10) undergraduates
(n  17)
–Higher rates of false
recognition (Study 1)
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Paradigm Study Group Control group
Main finding with respect to
dissociation
Item-wise, neutral
(Study 1 and 2),
threat and sex stimuli
(Study 2)
Elzinga et al.
(2000)
Study 1: High DIS–Q (1.5,
n  17)
Study 1: Low DIS–Q
(1.5, n  18)
–Inability to forget, most
pronounced for sex words
Study 2: High DIS–Q (1.7,
n  20), DID (n  14)
Study 2: Low DIS–Q
(1.7, n  23)
–Better memory performance in
general
List-wise, selective and
divided attention,
negative, and neutral
stimuli
McNally et al.
(2005)
Participants with recovered
(n  11), and continuous
(n  21) memories of abuse,
HC (n  16)
–No effect of dissociation on
DF performance
Inter-identity amnesia
Serial reaction time
task
Huntjens,
Postma, et
al. (2005)
DID (n  31) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25)
–DID patients showed a pattern
of inter-identity amnesia that
was readily mimicked by
simulators
Evaluative conditioning
task with subsequent
affective priming
task
Huntjens,
Peters, et al.
(2005)
DID (n  21) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25)
–Intact transfer of learned
valence between identities
Logical memory—Story
A and visual
reproduction from
WMS–R (learning
and delayed recall in
different identity
states)
Huntjens et al.
(2006)
DID (n  22) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25), guessors
(n  25)
–Patients and simulators
performed below chance, but
differed in strategy
Word list (positive,
negative, and neutral
stimuli) learned in
different identity
states
Huntjens et al.
(2007)
DID (n  22) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25), guessors
(n  25)
–Frequency of intrusions
between word lists were
equal between DID and HC
–DID recognized a
considerable amount of
words learned in other
identity state
Perceptual priming
task, word stem
completion task
Huntjens et al.
(2002)
DID (n  31) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25)
–Inter-identity priming was
apparent for both tasks
Word list (neutral
stimuli) learned in
different identity
states
Huntjens et al.
(2003)
DID (n  31) HC (n  25), HC with
simulation instruction
(n  25)
–DID performed equally as did
control participants in terms
of memory performance
Autobiographical memory specificity and fragmentation
Neutral and negative
cues, recall
constrained to period
of trauma or
unconstrained
Harvey et al.
(1998)
ASD (n  12) HC (n  12) –Low specificity in the
unconstrained condition was
associated with dissociative
symptoms
Neutral, negative, and
positive cues
Jones et al.
(1999)
BPD (n  23) HC (n  23) –Dissociation predicted
overgeneral memory to
negative cue words
Positive and negative
cue words
Kremers et al.
(2004)
BPD (N  83) –No significant relation with
memory specificity
Pre- and posttreatment
change
Kremers et al.
(2006)
BPD (N  55) –Increase in specific memories
was not related to decrease
in dissociative symptoms
Neutral, negative, and
positive cue words
Renneberg et
al. (2005)
BPD (n  30), depression
(n  27)
HC (n  30) –No significant relation with
memory specificity
Positive and negative
cue words
Wessel et al.
(2001)
High DES (30) undergraduates
(n  23)
Low DES (15)
undergraduates
(n  25)
–No group differences in
autobiographical memory
specificity
Emotional video
fragment and
memory
fragmentation task
Kindt & van
den Hout
(2003)
High DES (30) undergraduates
(n  20)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  20)
–Dissociation unrelated to
objective memory
fragmentation
644 GIESBRECHT, LYNN, LILIENFELD, AND MERCKELBACH
Table A1 (continued )
Paradigm Study Group Control group
Main finding with respect to
dissociation
Emotional video
fragment and
memory
fragmentation task
Kindt et al.
(2005)
High DES (30) undergraduates
(Study 1 and Study 2, n  25)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(Study 1 and Study
2, n  25)
–Dissociation unrelated to
objective memory
fragmentation
Deese–Roediger–McDermott task
Neutral word lists Clancy et al.
(2002)
Individuals with recovered
memories of alien abduction
(n  11) and who think they
were abducted by aliens
(n  9)
HC (n  13) –DES marginally associated
with false recall
Neutral and emotional
word lists
Geraerts et al.
(2005)
Participants with recovered
(n  23), repressed (n  16),
and continuous (n  55)
memory of abuse,
HC (n  20)
–DES predicted unrelated
intrusions on recall tests and
false recognition of unrelated
emotional words
Neutral word lists Winograd et
al. (1998)
Undergraduates (N  42) –Dissociation predicted
susceptibility to memory
illusions
Neutral word lists,
mood induction
(positive, negative,
neutral), varied recall
instruction
Wright et al.
(2005)
Undergraduates (N  156) –Dissociation unrelated to both
false recall and recognition
Imagination inflation
Standard instructions Heaps & Nash
(1999)
Undergraduates (N  55) –Greater imagination inflation
effect
Standard instructions
(Study 1), written
imagination (Study 2)
Horselenberg
et al. (2000)
Undergraduates (Study 1:
N  82, Study 2: N  45)
–Imagination inflation unrelated
to dissociation
Standard instructions Paddock et al.
(1998)
Undergraduates (N  99) –Greater imagination inflation
effect
Imagination of known
event and subsequent
remember–know
distinction (Study 1
and Study 2), DRM
task (Study 2)
Wilkinson &
Hyman
(1998)
Undergraduates (Study 1:
N  76, Study 2: N  112)
–DES Total, Absorption (Study
1), and Depersonalization
subscales (Study 2) were
related to changes in
remember–know judgments
–DES Depersonalization
subscale predicted number of
intrusions in DRM task
Reality monitoring
RM task Koppenhaver
et al. (1997)
High DES (M  33.89, n  47)
undergraduates
Medium (M  14.55,
n  127) and low
DES (M  33.89,
n  46)
–Unrelated to RM errors
RM task Kunzendorf &
Karpen
(1997)
Undergraduates (N  141) –Dissociation goes along with
longer time to discriminate
perception from vivid
imagery than from faint
imagery
RM task van den Hout
et al. (1996)
High DES (30) undergraduates
(n  30)
Low DES (10)
undergraduates
(n  30)
–No group differences in RM
errors
Emotional memory and memory errors
Emotional narrative
with picture slides
Montagne et
al. (2007)
DPD (n  12) HC (n  20) –No group differences in cued
recall
Emotional narrative Candel et al.
(2003)
High DES (30) undergraduate
students (n  18)
Low DES (6)
undergraduate
students (n  18)
–Higher rate of memory
commission errors
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Paradigm Study Group Control group
Main finding with respect to
dissociation
Video fragment and
subsequent
misleading
suggestions (with and
without perceptual
elaboration)
Drivdahl &
Zaragoza
(2001)
Undergraduates (N  132) –DES unrelated to false
memory creation
Staged event with
suggestive
questioning
Eisen &
Carlson
(1998)
Undergraduates (N  132) –DES related to errors on
misleading questions
Staged event Eisen,
Morgan, et
al. (2002)
Undergraduates (N  111) –DES–T was related to errors
on misleading questions
Emotional video
fragment
Giesbrecht,
Geraerts, &
Merckelbach
(2007)
Undergraduates (N  62) –Higher rate of memory
commission errors
Imagination and
subsequent recall of
positive and threat
words
Holtgraves &
Stockdale
(1997)
Undergraduates (N  201) –Poorer explicit memory for
the emotion words
Creation of false
childhood memory
Hyman &
Billings
(1998)
Undergraduates (N  48) –DES was related to false
memory creation
Old new picture
recognition (Study 1),
LEI (Study 2)
Merckelbach,
Muris,
Horselenberg,
& Stougie
(2000)
Undergraduates (N  42) –DES related to higher
tendency to claim having
seen new pictures –DES
predicted endorsement of
positive, negative, and
neutral LEI items
Staged event (Study 1),
emotional video
fragment with or
without divided
attention (Study 2)
and subsequent
repeated free recall
Merckelbach,
Zeles, et al.
(2007)
Undergraduates (Study 1:
N  36, Study 2: N  60)
–DES was related to
commission errors in both
studies
Cued recall of
introductory week
with genuine,
distorted, and
fabricated statements
Ost et al.
(1997)
Undergraduates (N  36) –Higher confidence in
memories of fabricated
events
Parental misinformation
paradigm
Ost et al.
(2005)
Undergraduates (N  31) –DES and DES–T predicted
false recall
Crashing memories
paradigm
Ost et al.
(2008)
Undergraduates (N  34) –Higher DES scores were
related to claim of having
seen events participants were
not exposed to
Spontaneous distortion
of memory of
Simpson verdict,
DRM task (neutral)
Platt et al.
(1998)
Undergraduates (N  82) –DES unrelated to spontaneous
memory distortion –DES
unrelated to DRM perfor-
mance
Generation of false
memories for
emotional childhood
event
Porter et al.
(2000)
Undergraduates (N  47) –Individuals that did generate a
false memory of a childhood
event exhibited higher DES
scores
Emotional video Sandberg et al.
(2001)
High DES (27) undergraduates
(n  20)
Low DES (14)
matched for SCL–90
(n  20) or low
SCL–90 (0.54,
n  26)
undergraduates
–No diminished recall for
danger cues in high
dissociators
Crashing memories
paradigm
Wilson &
French
(2006)
Undergraduates (N  100) –Dissociation related to
tendency to report having
seen non-existent footage
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Table A2. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Definition
ASD Acute stress disorder
BADS Behavioral Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome
BPD Borderline personality disorder
CBT Corsi Block Test
CSA Childhood sexual abuse
CVLT California Verbal Learning Test
DD Dissociative disorder
DDNOS Dissociative disorder not otherwise specified
DES Dissociative Experiences Scale
DES–II Dissociative Experiences Scale II
DES–T Dissociative Experiences Scale Taxon
DF Directed forgetting
DID Dissociative identity disorder
DIS–Q Dissociation Questionnaire
DPD Depersonalization disorder
DRM Deese–Roediger–McDermott
DS Digit Span
DSM–III Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed.)
DSM–IV Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.)
ERP Event-related potential
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging
GAD Generalized anxiety disorder
GSS Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility
HC Healthy control participants
IGT Iowa gambling task
LEI Life Events Inventory
MDD Major depressive disorder
O-SPAN Operation Span
PTSD Posttraumatic stress disorder
RM Reality monitoring
RNG Random number generation
SCID–D Structured Clinical Interview for the Dissociative Disorders
SCL–90 Symptom Checklist 90
TNT Think–no think task
TOT Tower of Toronto
WAIS Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
WASI Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
WCST Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
WM Working memory
WMS–R Wechsler Memory Scale—Revised
WTAR Wechsler Test of Adult Reading
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